The Fanniegate Gate Map: Every Clock, Gate, and Unlock Between Now and the Recap, Tied Out
Glen's Verdict
The juniors trade at forty cents on the par dollar after a year of IPO-timing headlines. Meanwhile the D.C. Circuit affirmed the bad-faith verdict, the companies' own capital math turned in the juniors' favor, and the President's MBS order backed Treasury into reopening the PSPA. Here is every gate, dated, with the numbers reconciled.
September 8 is the tell. October 22 is the trigger. The letter agreement is the event. The cash from the judgment is a footnote; the calendar it puts on the government is not.
If you're new here: I'm Glen Bradford. I'm long Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac junior preferred shares and have written the full Fanniegate thesis for years. Yesterday's post did one piece of arithmetic: the President's $200 billion MBS order does not fit under the PSPA's $225 billion portfolio caps. This post is the whole board. It reconciles the retained portfolios month by month so you can check every number against the filings, lays out the back history of how each constraint got here, maps every gate between today and a recapitalization with who holds the key, dates the calendar, and then says what I think it means for the price. It is long on purpose. Skip to the part you need.
- The government breached its duty of good faith to these shareholders in 2012. A jury said so in 2023, a judge entered $812 million in 2024, and a unanimous D.C. Circuit affirmed on July 24, 2026. The government's last cheap chance to keep fighting expires September 8; the judgment is final by the calendar on October 22 if nothing is filed. The cash is about two cents on the par dollar and does not matter. What matters is that the litigation excuse ends and the finding stands unappealed.
- The President ordered $200 billion of MBS buying in January. The PSPA caps the portfolios at $225 billion each. On the cap's own basis, there was $154.6 billion of room on day one and $112.7 billion now, and the buying stopped in Q2. Finishing the order requires Treasury to reopen the PSPA, the same document that holds the $193.5 billion senior preferred. Nobody else can do it.
- Every gate between here and a recap has the same two signatures on it, Bessent and Pulte, and none needs Congress. The companies' own Q2 filings show that resolving the senior preferred at face value turns regulatory capital positive the same day and leaves the juniors, already Tier 1, untouched.
- The juniors are down a third this year at forty cents on the par dollar, entirely on timing headlines. This market prices legal losses instantly, under-reacts to legal wins and re-rates them over months, and gaps on political signals. The dates ahead are the first ones in years the government cannot move by staying quiet.
- Consensus is "after the midterms," and that is in the price. The pre-midterm case is affordability: the GSE bid is the only mortgage-rate lever the administration fully controls, and using it runs into the cap. The end of the term, January 2029, is the hard outer date; a sale on this watch means the senior preferred is resolved in 2027.
Part I. The tie-out: retained portfolios, month by month
Two sources, both from the companies: the monthly summaries (Fannie, June 2026; Freddie, June 2026) and the Q2 10-Qs (Fannie, Freddie). All figures $ millions of unpaid principal unless marked. "Cap basis" is the balance the PSPA cap is tested against: UPB plus 10% of the notional of interest-only securities.
Fannie Mae retained mortgage portfolio
| Month | Purchases | Sales | Liquidations | End balance | Agency securities | Mortgage loans | Cap basis ($B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 2025 | 24,377 | (13,768) | (1,446) | 132,461 | 71,514 | 60,843 | 134.2 |
| Jan 2026 | 25,449 | (14,414) | (1,858) | 141,638 | 83,038 | 58,497 | 143.5 |
| Feb 2026 | 25,525 | (14,798) | (1,972) | 150,393 | 87,262 | 63,029 | 152.3 |
| Mar 2026 | 33,460 | (12,438) | (2,677) | 168,738 | 104,924 | 63,713 | 170.9 |
| Apr 2026 | 31,461 | (22,471) | (2,885) | 174,843 | 110,459 | 64,284 | 177.1 |
| May 2026 | 24,867 | (25,429) | (2,106) | 172,175 | 105,092 | 66,984 | 174.6 |
| Jun 2026 | 23,855 | (18,975) | (2,007) | 175,048 | 104,477 | 70,474 | 177.5 |
| H1 2026 | 164,617 | (108,525) | (13,505) | +42,587 | +32,963 | +9,631 | +43.3 |
Ties: every month rolls forward (prior balance + purchases − sales − liquidations = end balance) and the year-to-date columns sum. The December and June balances are the 10-Q figures to the dollar ($132,461M and $175,048M). The 10-Q's "for this purpose" cap balance of $177.5 billion is the June cap-basis figure. The 10-Q's own agency-securities line ($70,416M → $103,487M) runs about $1.0 billion below the monthly summary's because the 10-Q table excludes reverse-mortgage securities and wrapped private-label paper; the totals tie exactly, the sub-line differs by definition, and the H1 change is the same either way ($33.1B vs $33.0B).
Freddie Mac mortgage-related investments portfolio
| Month | Purchases | Sales | Liquidations | End balance | Agency securities | Mortgage loans | Cap basis ($B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 2025 | 45,607 | (28,967) | (996) | 139,227 | 44,577 | 93,727 | 161.2 |
| Jan 2026 | 32,298 | (33,675) | (1,041) | 136,809 | 48,547 | 87,345 | 158.7 |
| Feb 2026 | 34,999 | (32,199) | (1,037) | 138,572 | 55,585 | 82,102 | 160.4 |
| Mar 2026 | 42,042 | (39,713) | (1,140) | 139,761 | 56,285 | 82,576 | 161.5 |
| Apr 2026 | 40,683 | (37,142) | (1,494) | 141,808 | 56,180 | 84,734 | 163.3 |
| May 2026 | 34,856 | (38,359) | (1,083) | 137,222 | 56,297 | 80,038 | 158.6 |
| Jun 2026 | 35,307 | (32,584) | (1,374) | 138,571 | 56,227 | 81,461 | 159.8 |
| H1 2026 | 220,185 | (213,672) | (7,168) | −656 | +11,650 | −12,266 | −1.4 |
Ties: same roll-forward, same YTD sums. Freddie's 10-Q Table 9 discloses the cap-basis line directly: "Mortgage-related investments portfolio for purposes of Purchase Agreement cap" $159,750M at June 30 vs $161,222M at December 31, with the 10%-of-IO add-on at $21,179M and $21,995M. The 10-Q's mortgage-related securities ($45.5B → $57.1B) equals the monthly summary's agency plus non-agency securities. Inside the loans line, unsecuritized multifamily fell from $37.9B to $21.9B while single-family rose from $55.8B to $59.6B; the multifamily runoff is what funded the MBS growth without moving the cap balance.
What was actually bought, and where the room went
| Net change in agency securities, $M | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fannie Mae | +33,410 | −447 | +32,963 |
| Freddie Mac | +11,708 | −58 | +11,650 |
| Combined | +45,118 | −505 | +44,613 |
| Cap basis, $B | Dec 31, 2025 | Jun 30, 2026 | Cap | Room, Dec 31 | Room, Jun 30 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fannie Mae | 134.2 | 177.5 | 225 | 90.8 | 47.5 |
| Freddie Mac | 161.2 | 159.8 | 225 | 63.8 | 65.2 |
| Combined | 295.4 | 337.3 | 450 | 154.6 | 112.7 |
The tie-out says three things plainly. The $200 billion order never fit: $154.6 billion of room on the day it was given. The buying stopped: +$45.1 billion in Q1, −$0.5 billion in Q2, with Fannie a net seller of agency paper in May. The room is being eaten by other things: Fannie's retained loans (delinquent-loan buyouts and lender-liquidity purchases) grew $9.6 billion in the half on their own. Roughly $155 billion of the order remains against $112.7 billion of room that is also shrinking from the inside.
Part II. The back history
How the cap got here
| When | What |
|---|---|
| Sept 2008 | Original PSPAs: portfolios capped at $850 billion each, declining 10% a year. |
| Aug 17, 2012 | Third Amendment (the Net Worth Sweep">net worth sweep). Also accelerated the portfolio wind-down to 15% a year to a $250 billion floor, reached December 31, 2018. |
| 2019 | FHFA directs the companies to manage to $225 billion (below the $250 billion contract cap) and, from 2020, to count 10% of interest-only notional. A direction, not yet a covenant. |
| Jan 14, 2021 | Letter agreement (Mnuchin/Calabria) makes it contractual: PSPA §5.7, "$250 billion... on December 31, 2021, or... on December 31, 2022, and thereafter, $225 billion," with IO at 10% of notional ([text](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000031052221000004/january142021letteragreeme.htm)). |
| Sept 14, 2021 | Yellen/Thompson suspend the January 2021 covenants on cash-window volume, investor properties, high-risk loans, and multifamily. The portfolio cap is not among them. ([FHFA](https://www.fhfa.gov/news/news-release/fhfa-and-treasury-suspending-certain-portions-of-the-2021-preferred-stock-purchase-agreements)) |
| 2024 | Fannie's FY2024 10-K: "we are currently managing our business to a $202.5 billion mortgage asset cap according to FHFA instructions." A second FHFA layer under the contract cap. |
| Jan 2, 2025 | Letter agreement (Yellen/Thompson) deletes the suspended 2021 covenants, makes "technical updates" to the definition of Mortgage Assets, and, more importantly, requires Treasury's written consent for any conservatorship exit. Cap unchanged at $225 billion. |
| Oct 2025 | FHFA raises the amount of agency MBS each company may hold for investment to $40 billion. The $202.5 billion sub-cap disappears from the FY2025 10-K. |
| Jan 8, 2026 | The President: "I am instructing my Representatives to BUY $200 BILLION DOLLARS IN MORTGAGE BONDS." Pulte: "We are on it, Mr. President!" Bessent the next day: match the Fed's ~$15 billion a month of runoff. |
| Jan 12, 2026 | FHFA email lifts its own MBS sub-limit from $40 billion to $225 billion apiece, "effective immediately" ([AP via Fortune](https://fortune.com/2026/01/24/what-happened-mortgage-bonds-trump-pulte-fannie-mae-freddie-mac/)). FHFA's ceiling now equals Treasury's. Only the CMO $5 billion sub-cap survives. |
| Today | No PSPA amendment in 2026. Both 10-Qs recite the $225 billion cap. The only knob left is §5.7. |
How the PSPA gets amended, and every time it has been
A PSPA change is a letter agreement between Treasury and each company "acting through the Federal Housing Finance Agency as its conservator." No Congress, no comment period, no Federal Register. One letter can amend the purchase agreement, the senior preferred stock certificate (where the liquidation preference lives), and the warrant at once; the January 2025 letter did all three in thirteen kilobytes. Every one has landed as an 8-K, and I checked every 8-K both companies have filed since: none in 2025 after January, none in 2026.
| Date | Instrument | Effect | Warning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sept 7, 2008 | SPSPA + warrant | $100B commitment each; senior preferred; warrant for 79.9% of common at $0.00001/share | None |
| May 6, 2009 | First Amendment | Commitment to $200B each | None |
| Dec 24, 2009 | Second Amendment | Commitment becomes a formula through 2012 | Christmas Eve |
| Aug 17, 2012 | Third Amendment | Net worth sweep; portfolio wind-down accelerated | Same day, no notice |
| Dec 21, 2017 | Letter agreement | $3B capital reserve each | Same day |
| Sept 27, 2019 | Letter agreement | Retention to $25B / $20B | Same day |
| Jan 14, 2021 | Letter agreement | Retain to full capital; cap to $225B; exit preconditions; product covenants | ~2 months of reporting |
| Sept 14, 2021 | Letter agreement | Suspends the 2021 product covenants | Same day |
| Jan 2, 2025 | Letter agreement + side letter | Deletes suspended covenants; Treasury consent required for exit; ERCF "as amended from time to time"; side letter requires FHFA RFI + proposal covering "any amendments to the SPSPA, senior preferred stock certificate or warrant that may be required" ([Treasury](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2767)) | Announced next day |
The next one will be the first of Bessent's Treasury. It is contemplated by the last one.
How the lawsuit got here
| When | What |
|---|---|
| Aug 17, 2012 | Net worth sweep imposed by the Third Amendment. |
| 2013 | Shareholder suits filed in D.D.C. (consolidated as 1:13-mc-01288-RCL, Judge Lamberth) and elsewhere. |
| Feb 2017 | D.C. Circuit in Perry Capital dismisses the APA claims but revives the implied-covenant contract claims. That is the claim that went to trial. |
| June 2021 | Collins v. Yellen: Supreme Court holds FHFA acted within its statutory authority. Confirms authority; does not decide whether the exercise breached shareholder contracts. The government spent the next five years arguing it did. |
| Aug 2023 | Jury verdict, second trial: $612.4 million for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. |
| Mar 20, 2024 | Final Judgment $812.05 million with prejudgment interest ([ECF 421](https://fannie-freddieclassaction.com/media/a1wpgqu4/2024-03-20-final-judgment.pdf)), post-judgment interest at 5.01% "until paid," and an Order Governing Plan of Allocation ([ECF 421-1](https://fannie-freddieclassaction.com/media/orhncg3d/2024-03-20-order-governing-plan-of-allocation.pdf)). Judgment runs jointly and severally against each company and FHFA as conservator. |
| Mar 14, 2025 / Apr 9, 2025 | Lamberth denies the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. Three weeks later, with the appeal barely noticed, class counsel moves for approval of a post-judgment notice and a fee-motion schedule (ECF 432). The distribution machinery was being built during the appeal, not after it. |
| Apr 21, 2026 | D.C. Circuit argument, No. 25-5113 ([my recap](/blog/fannie-freddie-dc-circuit-oral-argument-recap-april-21-2026)). |
| Jul 24, 2026 | Affirmed in full. Ginsburg for a unanimous panel (Walker, Childs): "By adopting the Net Worth Sweep, the FHFA, as conservator of Fannie and Freddie, violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contract with shareholders... Because these arguments lack merit, we affirm the judgment of the district court." Berkley's $48 billion restitution cross-appeal rejected. ([opinion](https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/07/25-5113-2184921.pdf)) |
| Today | Fannie 10-Q: "Consideration is being given to the possibility of further action." Freddie: "The defendants are evaluating potential next steps." No petition on the docket that I can find; no statement from FHFA or Treasury. |
How the policy drumbeat got here
The promotion timeline has the full record. The short version for this post: May 2025, the President says he is "working on TAKING THESE AMAZING COMPANIES PUBLIC" with the "implicit GUARANTEES" kept. Bessent, December 17, 2025: an offering is "not off the table. We're working on it very deliberately," conditioned on MBS spreads. Pulte, February 6, 2026: the companies are "definitely ready" for a 2.5 to 5 percent sale, "up to the president when or if he decides to do it." Then the calendar went quiet: Wedbush on March 13, "the only discussion we are expecting from the administration regarding these two until after the midterms, if at all, is around the issue of lowering mortgage cost"; Pulte named acting Director of National Intelligence in June while keeping FHFA; the President on June 5, "It's not a rush." July and August: no underwriters, no filing, no date.
Part III. The gate map
Every gate between today and a recapitalized, released, or partially sold company; who holds the key; what is actually required; where it stands. The order is roughly the order they have to open.
| Gate | Key holder | What it takes | Status | What it unlocks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Lamberth finality | FHFA (Pulte); the SG for any cert petition | Do nothing. Rehearing window closes Sept 8; cert window closes Oct 22; the Plan of Allocation's "Final Non-appealable Judgment" is met by the calendar. | Clock running; no filing found. | Record date, distribution to current holders; the litigation excuse ends; an unappealed appellate finding of bad faith. |
| 2. Portfolio cap | Treasury + FHFA letter agreement | Amend PSPA §5.7. FHFA has no knob left. | $112.7B room; $155B of the order unfilled; buying stopped in Q2. Wall around Q1 2027 if buying resumes at a moderate pace, never if it stays parked. | The President's order can be completed. The PSPA is open. |
| 3. Senior preferred | Treasury + FHFA letter agreement amending the SPS certificate | Convert, cancel, or write down $193.5B face / $380.8B liquidation preference (→ $388.4B on Sept 30). CBO's base case is conversion to common at face. | Nothing filed. Preference ratchets ~$7–8B a quarter. | CET1 goes from −$46.6B combined to positive the same day ([Q2 disclosures](/blog/fannie-freddie-q2-2026-ercf-capital-disclosures)); the juniors, already Tier 1, are undisturbed. |
| 4. Exit consent | Treasury (Bessent), on FHFA's proposal | Jan 2025 side letter: FHFA public RFI, FSOC briefing, proposal covering "any amendments to the SPSPA... that may be required," then Treasury consults the President. | Not begun. Federal Register: zero FHFA documents on conservatorship termination since Jan 2025. Not needed for a minority stake sale while in conservatorship. | Release from conservatorship. |
| 5. Capital rule | FHFA rulemaking | Nothing required for a stake sale. ERCF is already "as amended from time to time" in the PSPA, so a future cut flows through automatically. | No 2026 ERCF proposal filed. [DFAST 2026](/blog/fannie-freddie-2026-dfast-stress-test-break-even): break-even through a worse-than-2008 crash. | Lower buffers; faster path to "fully capitalized." |
| 6. Offering | The President; Treasury; FHFA | Underwriters, registration, a decision. Pulte: "definitely ready" for 2.5–5%. | "It's not a rush." No banks, no filing. Wedbush: after the midterms if at all. | A public mark; the "largest IPO in history" Lutnick keeps mentioning. |
| 7. Warrants | Treasury | Expire Sept 7, 2028; Treasury said in Jan 2025 it "expects that the parties will agree in the future to extend." | Soft clock. Marked at $78.6B combined in Treasury's FY2025 statements. | Treasury's 79.9% of the common becomes real shares. |
| 8. Congress | Nobody needs it | Fitzgerald's H.R. 9460 §8 says "The Secretary of the Treasury may convert the Senior Preferred Stocks of each enterprise into common equity" and directs the warrant exercise and sale within two years. | Introduced June 25; zero cosponsors; no markup. | Political cover for the face-value path, not a prerequisite for it. |
Read the key-holder column. Gates 1 through 6 have the same two names on them. Gate 1 opens by inaction on a fixed date. Gate 2 now has a deadline attached to the President's own promise. Gate 3 is the event. Gates 4 through 8 are downstream of 3.
Part IV. The calendar
| Date | What | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| ~Aug 26–28 | July monthly summaries (Freddie, then Fannie) | Did the MBS buying resume, or is the program parked at 22%? |
| Tue Sept 8 | Rehearing / en banc deadline, D.C. Cir. 25-5113 (45 days from July 24; Sept 7 is Labor Day) | The tell. A quiet day means the cheap route to further review is closed. |
| ~Sept 15 | Mandate issues if no petition | The D.C. Circuit is done. |
| Sept 30 | Liquidation preference steps to $238.0B (Fannie) / $150.4B (Freddie) = $388.4B | Another $7.6B on the number Treasury has to resolve. |
| Thu Oct 22 | Cert deadline (90 days from July 24) | The trigger. If nothing is filed, the judgment is "Final Non-appealable" by the calendar. Watch for a Rule 13.5 extension application at the Supreme Court in the second half of October; that is the one way it slips without a petition (up to 60 days). |
| After Oct 22 | Judgment paid; allocation notice; court approves distribution method and sets a Record Date; A.B. Data pays through brokers | Paid to holders as of the record date, not as of 2021. The claim travels with the shares. Realistically first half of 2027; two cents on the par dollar; irrelevant to the thesis except as a technical bid into the record date. |
| ~Oct 29–30 | Q3 10-Qs | Next cap-basis read; next word on "further action." |
| Nov 3 | Midterms | The Street's stated reason nothing happens before then. |
| Mid-Nov | Q3 ERCF disclosures | The recap math, updated. |
| Q1 2027 (approx.) | Cap wall if buying resumes at a moderate pace | The PSPA either opens or the President's order is visibly abandoned. |
| Sept 7, 2028 | Warrants expire (extendable) | The soft outer clock. |
Part V. The bid
Here is where the juniors have traded through all of it. FNMAS is the most liquid Fannie series and the market's yardstick; FMCKJ the same for Freddie. Both are $25 par. Daily closes:
| Date | What happened | FNMAS | FMCKJ | FNMA common |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 31, 2025 | Year-end | $15.23 | $14.40 | $10.73 |
| Jan 23, 2026 | Two weeks after the $200B order; "almost certainly delays IPO" | $12.50 | $11.47 | $8.87 |
| Mar 13, 2026 | Wedbush: nothing until after the midterms | $12.60 | $11.61 | $6.10 |
| Jun 5, 2026 | Pulte named acting DNI; "It's not a rush" | $11.70 | $10.95 | $6.70 |
| Jul 21, 2026 | 2026 low for the preferred | $9.37 | $8.88 | — |
| Jul 24, 2026 | D.C. Circuit affirms, unanimous | $9.55 | $9.13 | $6.21 |
| Aug 18, 2026 | Today | $10.07 | $9.67 | $6.21 |
The junior preferred is down about a third on the year and trades at roughly forty cents on the par dollar. On the day a unanimous appellate panel affirmed that the government breached its duty of good faith to these exact securities, the most liquid series moved up 1.3%. Every leg down in that table is an IPO-timing headline. Not one is a change in the legal or contractual position, which strengthened in every one of those months: the affirmance in July; the Q2 capital disclosures showing the juniors already sit inside Tier 1 and the senior preferred is the sole reason CET1 reads negative; DFAST showing the balance sheet breaks even through a worse-than-2008 crash; and a portfolio cap that now forces the PSPA question. The market sold the timing and threw out the position with it.
How this market reacts: the record
Before guessing how holders react to September 8 and October 22, look at how they have reacted to everything else. FNMAS daily closes; d1 = the event day's move, d5 and d20 = five and twenty trading days later, all measured from the prior close.
| Catalyst | Type | d1 | d5 | d20 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 21, 2017 — Perry Capital (APA claims dismissed) | Legal loss | −28% | −23% | −35% |
| Jun 23, 2021 — Collins v. Yellen | Legal loss | −62% | −68% | −69% |
| Aug 14, 2023 — jury verdict, $612M | Legal win | +12% | +14% | +9% |
| Mar 20, 2024 — final judgment, $812M | Legal win | +3% | −6% | −3% |
| Nov 6, 2024 — election result | Political | +69% | +95% | +113% |
| May 22, 2025 — Trump "very serious consideration" | Political | +15% | +19% | +19% |
| Jan 8–15, 2026 — $200B order, FHFA limit lift, "delays IPO" | Timing | −1% | −14% | −8% |
| Mar 13, 2026 — Wedbush "after the midterms" | Timing | −1% | −10% | +2% |
| Jun 5, 2026 — Pulte to DNI, "not a rush" | Timing | −1% | +1% | −12% |
| Jul 24, 2026 — D.C. Circuit affirms | Legal win | +1.3% | +4.5% | +6.8% |
Three things jump out. Legal losses are priced instantly and violently: Collins took 62% off the preferred in one session. Legal wins are under-reacted on the day and re-rated over months: the verdict was +12% on the day and the preferred nearly doubled by the time the judgment was entered seven months later; the affirmance was +1.3% on the day and is +7% three weeks on, with the July 21 low holding. Political signals move it hardest: the election was +69% in a day and +113% in a month; one Trump sentence in May 2025 was worth 15%. Timing news bleeds it slowly rather than gapping it.
And that is the whole shape of the past year. From the October 2025 high of $17.57, after Lutnick's "largest IPO in history," Bessent's "very deliberately," and Pulte's "could be Q1 or Q2 2026," the most liquid junior preferred lost 47% to the July low without a single adverse legal or contractual development. It was all timing: the MBS pivot, the "not before the midterms" consensus, the Pulte-to-DNI headline, "It's not a rush." Every one of those is a statement about when, and not one of them changed whether or how much.
That is also the honest base case for what comes next. September 8 and October 22 are legal-finality events without a headline, which this market has historically absorbed slowly and then re-rated. A record-date order is a scheduled mechanical event, which this market has never had. And a letter agreement is a political-structural event, the category that gaps.
Three layers of bid, in increasing importance:
Mechanical, and least important. About $914 million with post-judgment interest, less fees, paid to holders of record pro rata to par (stated value for Fannie series, redemption price for Freddie series). Call it two to two and a half cents on the par dollar, gross. In the context of a recap that turns forty cents into par, it is a rounding error, and I want to be plain about that: nobody should own these for the check. It matters only as a technical: it goes to whoever holds the shares on a record date the court will set after October 22, so there is a reason to be long into that date and no reason to be short into it. It supports; it does not spike.
Narrative. After September 8 and again after October 22, every article, brief, and Treasury talking point about how the juniors should be treated in a restructuring gets a different sentence in it: not "a jury verdict the government is appealing," but an unappealed, unanimous appellate holding that the last time the government reached into these companies' capital structure it violated its duty of good faith to the shareholders. Bloomberg Law wrote up the affirmance the day it came out (Barash); Law360 and Inside Mortgage Finance did too. There are three more natural stories in the chain, and each lands in front of the readers who sold the timing: "government won't appeal," "checks going to current holders," and "Treasury amends the PSPA."
Structural. The litigation excuse ends. Every remaining decision about the senior preferred is discretionary and belongs to two people, and the portfolio cap gives one of those decisions a deadline attached to the President's own promise. When the PSPA opens, the question of what else gets written in it is live, and it gets written by a government that just chose to stop fighting the last war. Nothing in the July 24 opinion prevents an ugly restructuring; it affirmed the denial of rescission and killed the $48 billion restitution theory. It just makes the ugly versions politically costlier, and it puts a dated, unappealed finding on the record for anyone drafting the next document.
September to remember: the sequence in one place
Why September 8 is the tell even though it is not the last legal date. A rehearing petition is not a prerequisite for cert; the government could let September 8 pass and still petition by October 22. But the two filings are not alike. En banc is a brief the private counsel who argued the case (Arnold and Porter) can file on their own. A cert petition for a federal agency runs through the Solicitor General, who does not spend the office's capital on a unanimous, fact-bound state-law contract ruling with no circuit split and $812 million at stake unless someone senior insists. The opinion is a poor vehicle besides: it already cut against shareholders on rescission and the $48 billion restitution theory, so there is no clean question presented. And petitioning means Pulte's FHFA asking the Supreme Court to keep fighting the holders of companies he told the market in February were "definitely ready" for a sale. If they will not make the cheap filing, the expensive one is unlikely. Not impossible. Unlikely.
Why October 22 is the trigger. The Plan of Allocation's definition does the work: "Final Non-appealable Judgment" means the D.C. Circuit is done and "the time for filing petitions for writ of certiorari has expired with no petition having been filed." Ninety days from July 24 is October 22. Nobody rules; the clock runs out. Two things could still move it without a petition: a Rule 13.5 extension application at the Supreme Court (up to 60 days, filed in the second half of October) or a rehearing petition on September 8, which resets the cert clock entirely.
Why the distribution can be fast, and why that is unusual. A normal securities class action pays through a claims process: forms, proof of trades in a class period, a year or two of administration. This one was built differently. The classes are holders as of December 7, 2021 "or their successors in interest to the extent shares were sold after that date and before any final judgment," and the Plan of Allocation pays holders as of a court-approved Record Date through their brokers, pro rata to par, with no claim form. The claim travels with the shares and gets paid like a dividend. Class counsel built that architecture in January 2024, before the appeal, and the defendants appealed the Order Governing Plan of Allocation itself along with the judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed both. The post-sweep-purchaser standing holding in the opinion rests on the same principle: the chose in action moved with the stock. So there is no "who gets paid" fight left to have. What remains after October 22 is mechanical, and some of it was staged a year ago: in April 2025, mid-appeal, class counsel moved for approval of a post-judgment notice and a scheduling order for the fee motion (ECF 432 on the D.D.C. docket); the defendants' only substantive objection was that the notice must spell out the deduction for opt-out shares, and they asked for a joint status report within ten days of the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Whether Judge Lamberth has ruled on that motion is not visible in any free source, and the class site's court-documents page shows nothing after the July 24 opinion. So here is the honest range. The steps left are: the mandate (mid-September); the notice-and-objection cycle, which can run in parallel with the cert clock because the Plan gates disbursement, not the process; the fee motion; a hearing and an order approving fees, the allocation, the distribution method, and the Record Date; the judgment actually being paid into a fund (interest runs at 5.01% until it is); and then A.B. Data through the brokers, which the record-date precedents (Lehman, GM, WaMu) put at four to ten weeks. If the papers are staged and the court moves, a Record Date in the first quarter of 2027 and cash a month or two later; if every step goes serially, mid-2027. Either way the money is a 2027 event and the finality is an October one, and only the second of those matters to this thesis. The first visible signals: a status report or notice order on the D.D.C. docket, a new PDF on the class site, and the Q3 10-Qs in late October. One loose end worth knowing: the class notice says recovery goes "only to those who are shareholders at the time of the final judgment," while the Plan pays on the Record Date; nothing public reconciles the two.
Other angles worth holding in mind
"It's not a rush" is a seller's sentence, not a bystander's. The government owns the asset. A seller who says he is in no rush, and who says on the same days that the stake is worth "many times" what he could have sold it for and that people are wrong to value it at $500 to $700 billion, is describing a valuation problem, not a disinterest problem. The things that raise the mark are exactly the recap steps: resolve the senior preferred so the capital reads positive, clean the cap table, then sell. "No rush" on the sale is entirely consistent with doing the paperwork first. It is also consistent with the President putting his own voice on two Fannie Mae television ads this year, which is not something you do for a stake you intend to let sit.
The offering conditions and the MBS program are the same machine. Bessent's stated condition for an offering, in December, was that MBS spreads "remain the same or come down." The MBS buying is what tightened them. The buying stopped in Q2 because the room ran thin and the relative value went away. If Treasury wants tight spreads for a sale, it needs the companies buying again, and that runs straight into the cap. The offering itself generates the amendment.
The consensus is "after the midterms," and the price already reflects it. The Street said it in March, and it is the working assumption across the investor community. That is why the preferred sits at forty cents on the par dollar. Which is the point: the calendar in Part IV has three dates before November 3 that the government cannot move by staying quiet, and anything that happens on them is, by definition, not in the price. Optics cut the other way as well. A letter agreement that treats shareholders well is easier to sign on November 4 than October 4. Several prior letter agreements were signed at holidays or transitions: December 24, 2009; December 21, 2017; January 14, 2021; January 2, 2025. The natural windows after the midterms are the year-end and the January turn, which is also about when the cap wall arrives if the buying resumes.
Housing affordability is a midterm issue, and the only rate lever the administration fully controls runs through the cap. The Fed sets the policy rate; the market sets the 10-year; the President's one direct instrument on mortgage rates is the one he reached for in January: the GSE bid for MBS. The Street's own math says the January program was worth roughly 25 basis points of spread and 15 to 20 of it reached borrowers. If affordability is the argument the administration wants to make in October, the tool is sitting on the shelf with $112.7 billion of room, and using it at any real pace puts the cap in play before the election, not after. That is the pre-midterm case for the amendment, and it does not depend on anybody caring about shareholders. It depends on somebody caring about a rate.
The end of the term is a hard date even if the warrants are soft. Treasury said it expects to extend the September 2028 warrant expiration. The presidency ends January 20, 2029, and that is not extendable. A sale with a real syndicate takes six to nine months from restructuring to pricing. If the plan is a sale on this President's watch at a mark he is willing to defend, the senior preferred is resolved by 2027. Every strand of this post, the litigation clock, the cap wall, and the offering calendar, points at the same year.
And two that cut against me. The liquidation preference grows every quarter, so if the resolution is anything other than face value, waiting makes Treasury's headline "recovery" bigger, not smaller; there is a version of "compensated for its past support" (Bessent, January 2025) that likes delay. And a Congress that changes hands in November holds hearings, not keys, but hearings change the optics of a face-value conversion. Neither changes who signs. Both change when.
Part VI. What would change my mind
- A rehearing petition on September 8. The cert clock resets to 90 days from denial and this whole calendar slides into 2027.
- A cert extension application in late October. Same effect, smaller: up to 60 days.
- A one-paragraph letter agreement that raises the portfolio cap and touches nothing else. That is the bear case on the PSPA leg and it is entirely possible. It would tell me Treasury is willing to open the document for the President's housing number but not for the shareholders yet.
- The MBS program quietly dying at 22%. Then the cap never binds and gate 2 stops being a deadline.
- Any Treasury signal that the senior preferred will not be resolved at face. The opinion doesn't stop that; it only raises the price of it.
What the next six months look like, and what to do while waiting
I get asked this by people who hold these and by people who advise people who hold these, so here it is without hedging.
What you will see, in order. Late August: the July monthly summaries, which say whether the MBS buying resumed. September 8: either a rehearing petition on the D.C. Circuit docket or nothing; nothing is the news. Mid-September: the mandate. September 30: the liquidation preference ticks up again in the Q3 numbers. October 22: either a cert petition or an extension application at the Supreme Court, or nothing; nothing means the judgment is final. Then, over the following months, a notice and eventually a record-date order on the D.D.C. docket, mirrored on the class site, and a small payment through your broker in 2027. Late October: the Q3 10-Qs, with the next cap-basis read and the next word on "further action." November 3: the midterms. Then the windows in which every prior letter agreement has tended to land: the year-end and the January turn.
What to do. Nothing, which is harder than it sounds. The whole point of this post is that the timeline is now driven by dates the government cannot quietly move, and the reaction record says this market prices legal wins slowly and political signals fast. If you own these for the recap, the check in November is irrelevant and the September and October dates are confirmations, not catalysts. The catalyst is a letter agreement on EDGAR, and it has never come with notice. The only actionable thing is to be positioned before the dates rather than after them, and to know in advance which filings would change the picture: a rehearing petition, a cert extension application, a cap raise that touches nothing else, or a Treasury signal that the senior preferred will not be resolved at face. Absent those, the calendar is doing the work.
What I'm doing
Nothing new. Long the junior preferred, same as I've been for years. What changed this month is not the position but the calendar: for the first time in a long time there are dates on it that the government cannot move by staying quiet. September 8 is a decision even if nobody makes it. October 22 is a trigger even if nobody pulls it. And the portfolio cap is a wall that the President's own order is driving toward.
The Sources
- Fannie Mae Form 10-Q, Q2 2026 · Q1 2026 · Form 10-K, 2025 · Freddie Mac Form 10-Q, Q2 2026
- Fannie Mae Monthly Summary, June 2026 · Freddie Mac Monthly Volume Summary, June 2026
- January 14, 2021 letter agreement · January 2, 2025 letter agreement (8-K exhibit) · Treasury release, Jan 3, 2025 · FHFA/Treasury Sept 14, 2021 suspension · Third Amendment, Aug 17, 2012
- D.C. Circuit opinion, Fairholme Funds v. FHFA, No. 25-5113 (July 24, 2026) · Final Judgment, Mar 20, 2024 · Order Governing Plan of Allocation · Official class site (A.B. Data) · FRAP 40 · FRAP 41
- Scotsman Guide, Jan 8 · Bessent on matching Fed runoff, Jan 9 · Fortune/AP, Jan 24 · Fox Business, Feb 25 · NMN, Feb 6 (Pulte "definitely ready") · NMN, Mar 13 (Wedbush) · NMN, Mar 28 (Barclays) · NMN, May 18 (JPM/BofA) · Rithm, Jun 4 · Bloomberg Law, Jul 24
- H.R. 9460 text (govinfo) · CBO, "Seven Things to Know" (July 2025)
- Price data: daily closes, Yahoo Finance, FNMAS / FMCKJ / FNMA.
If You Want to Go Deeper
- Yesterday: the $200B order vs the $225B cap — the arithmetic, in full
- Full Fanniegate thesis — the whole story
- The Q2 2026 ERCF Capital Disclosures — the companies' own recap math
- The 2026 DFAST stress test — break-even through a worse-than-2008 crash
- The Trump GSE Promotion Timeline — the drumbeat, dated and sourced
- D.C. Circuit oral argument recap, April 21 — the hearing that produced the affirmance
- Fanniegate Timeline — interactive milestone history
I hold long positions in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac junior preferred shares. This post is my personal opinion and is not financial advice. Portfolio, cap, judgment, and calendar figures are from the filings, court orders, and rules linked above; the reconciliations, the gate map, and the reading of what they imply are mine. Price history is from public daily closes. Whether the government files anything by September 8 or October 22, whether Treasury amends the PSPA, and what it writes when it does are open questions; this post argues they are now questions with dates on them. Do your own research. The full thesis is at glenbradford.com/fanniegate.
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Glen Bradford
Investor · Builder · Writer
MBA from Purdue. Former hedge fund manager. Holds 26 series of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac junior preferred stock. Built Cloud Nimbus for Salesforce consulting. Author of Act As If. Writes about investing, building things, and the longest financial fraud in American history.
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