Read the screenplay: FANNIEGATE — $7 trillion. 17 years. The biggest fraud in American capital markets.
Fanniegatefanniegate

The Construction-Loan Drumbeat Around Fannie and Freddie: Confirmation, Not the Trigger

Glen Bradford
Glen Bradford@DoNotLose
·8 min read

Glen's Verdict

Readers told me I skipped the construction-lending angle on Fannie and Freddie. They're half right. There's no construction-loan product, and a construction bill sitting at zero cosponsors doesn't free anybody. But a homebuilder on Fannie's board, a Pulte running the FHFA, and a President telling the companies to 'get big homebuilders going' are exactly what an owner does when it's fattening a business before it sells it.

The construction drumbeat isn't the mechanism of the exit — the guarantee is. But it's confirmation of the one thing that matters: the people in charge are acting like owners maximizing an asset, not liquidators winding one down. Here's what's real, what's vapor, and the bear case I have to answer honestly (KBW just cut its targets).

If you're new here: I'm Glen Bradford. I'm long Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac junior preferred shares — most of my net worth, not a side bet — and I've written the full Fanniegate thesis for years. This is analysis and opinion, not investment advice. I hold what I write about.

If you're back: my last post argued that the ERCF reform, the bank-capital rewrite, the g-fee fight, and the July FHFA report are all one move — the plumbing to recap and release the companies without a giant IPO. A few of you wrote in to say I left something out: the construction-lending drumbeat. So I went and did the work. Here's my read.


You flagged the angle I skipped. You're half right.

The people I trust in this corner of the market keep pointing me at construction lending as a bullish tell. "The drumbeat gets louder — good sign for exit." I get the instinct, and I think the instinct is directionally right. But I want to be precise about why, because the sloppy version of this argument gets torn apart, and I'd rather hand you the version that survives a skeptic.

Here's the distinction that matters: the construction stuff is a symptom of the exit posture, not the mechanism of the exit itself. It's evidence about intent — how the people running these companies are behaving. It is not the lever that gets them out of conservatorship. Confuse the two and a bear eats your lunch. Keep them straight and it's one more brick in the wall.


What's actually happening (and what isn't)

Let me separate the real from the rhetorical, because there's a lot of both.

Real — and this is the strong signal. In October 2025, Fannie Mae put a homebuilder inside the building. It appointed Brandon Hamara — a former land-strategy executive at Tri Pointe Homes, one of the country's largest builders — simultaneously to its board of directors and as head of operations for single-family and multifamily. He gave up a seat on Freddie's board to take it. Pulte announced it himself. You don't recruit builder-side operating talent onto your board if your plan is to shrink and wind down. You do it when you're building capability.

Real — the man at the top has homebuilding in his blood. FHFA Director Bill Pulte is the grandson of the founder of Pulte Homes. The homebuilder DNA isn't a metaphor; it's literally who Trump put in charge of the conservator.

Real, but only rhetoric so far. On October 5, 2025, Trump told Fannie and Freddie to "get Big Homebuilders going," accusing builders of "sitting on 2 Million empty lots, a RECORD." Strong language. But I'll be the first to tell you it was operationally vague — even sympathetic reporters called it a "mystery" what the companies could actually do, since a lot of those builder lots are raw land with no sewer or water. File it under intent, not action.

Real, but early. Pulte has the companies reviewing builder exposure — asking market participants to disclose the big builder loans they're selling, looking at builder pricing and liquidity. That's the conservator paying attention to the construction pipeline. It is not, yet, a new product.

Mostly vapor — for now. The bill everyone points to, Rep. Scott Fitzgerald's Working Families Home Construction Act (H.R. 9461), would have the GSEs finance construction loans — capped at $100,000 a unit, builders putting up at least 10%, homes sold to families at 90–130% of area median income. It's real, and it's part of a three-bill package whose centerpiece (H.R. 9460) is an actual statutory release framework. But as I write this, 9461 has zero cosponsors and no markup. A bill at introduction is a press release with a bill number. Don't build a thesis on it.

So: no GSE construction-loan product, no pilot, a bill going nowhere yet — but a homebuilder on the board, a Pulte at the helm, and a President barking about lots. The rhetoric is running well ahead of the mechanics. That's the honest picture.


Why it confirms the one move

Here's how it fits the thesis I laid out last time. If you believe — as I do — that the Trump team is deliberately not rushing a fire-sale IPO, and is instead reforming the capital rule to make the companies look their best before monetizing them, then the construction noise is exactly what you'd expect to see.

An owner preparing an asset for sale doesn't strip it down. It invests in it. It puts operators with the right expertise on the board. It talks up the growth story — new markets, new mandates, "get the builders going." A bigger, more capable Fannie and Freddie is a higher-valuation Fannie and Freddie, and a higher valuation is the entire point of waiting. The construction drumbeat is the sound of the administration treating these companies as going concerns to build up, not liabilities to unwind. That's a confirming data point for the ERCF-first, maximize-before-release read. It just isn't the release itself.


The bear case, stated fairly

I don't get to skip this part, and right now the bear case has real ammunition.

KBW just cut its targets. The Street's most-watched GSE analyst lowered its price targets to $8.50 on both names — down from $10 on Fannie and $9 on Freddie — and said the privatization window is narrowing, with low odds of getting it done before the November 2026 midterms. So while Ackman and the administration float big numbers, the sober analyst is marking his estimate down. That divergence is real and I'm not going to paper over it.

The plumbing experts say the footprint isn't the point — the guarantee is. This is the "Fed document" a few of you sent me. In April 2026 the New York Fed's Treasury Market Practices Group put out a consultative note, summarized on the Fed's Teller Window, making a plain point: agency MBS trade at a premium because of the implicit government guarantee. Change ownership in a way that removes — or even appears to remove — that guarantee, and the same bonds get treated as a credit product: wider spreads, less liquidity, higher mortgage rates. Nothing in there treats "the GSEs doing more" as a positive. Expansion is a sideshow to the guarantee.

And the skeptics say new mandates make it harder, not easier. Don Layton, the former Freddie CEO, has argued for years that piling unfunded mandates and cross-subsidies onto the companies scares off the private capital a release needs. Parrott and Zandi say much the same: the model doesn't work without a defined guarantee, and adding obligations before you've settled that is asking for trouble. Under their lens, a mandated, income-capped construction program reads as deeper government entanglement — the opposite of a bullish tell.


My rebuttal

Now here's where I part ways with the bears — and notice I can do it without leaning on the construction stuff at all, which is the whole point.

On KBW: they're trading the odds, not the endgame. Cutting a target because the timeline slipped past the midterms is a statement about when, not whether. I've never been in this for the next two quarters. Read their own logic — they say privatization needs action on capital, on the senior preferred, and on the guarantee. Those are exactly the three levers I argued are already moving. They're pricing the delay. I'm underwriting the destination.

On the guarantee: the TMPG note is the best argument for the patient, careful path — not against the exit. If the guarantee is the whole ballgame, then the administration's caution about how it releases (preserving that guarantee, watching mortgage rates, exactly what Bessent says he's watching) is the responsible version of getting to yes, not a reason it won't happen. It's a case for doing it right, not for not doing it.

On Layton and Parrott-Zandi: with respect, these are the housing-finance establishment's standing skeptics of administrative release. That's their prior, not a fresh finding. And their strongest version — "mandates deter capital" — is weaker than it looks against 9461 specifically, which funds itself by reallocating money the companies already spend on housing goals rather than adding a net-new burden. I take their guarantee point seriously. I take their "the sky will fall" posture as what it's been for a decade.

None of that rebuttal needs the construction drumbeat to be the mechanism. Which is exactly why the drumbeat's weakness as a mechanism doesn't touch the thesis. It was never load-bearing. It's confirmation.


The tell that isn't a bill

Strip away the legislation, which may go nowhere, and the rhetoric, which is vague. What's left is behavior. You do not put a big-builder executive on Fannie Mae's board, install a homebuilding heir as your conservator, and stand at a podium demanding the companies "get builders going" — if your plan is to shrink them into the sunset. You do those things when you think you own something valuable and you intend to make it more valuable before you let it go. That's the signal under the noise, and it lines up with everything else I've been writing.

The first hard date is still mid-July — the EO's 120-day FHFA report, due around July 11. It's internal, so don't expect fireworks on your screen. But it's the next checkpoint, and I'll tell you the moment anything real crosses it.


Where I sit

Nothing here changes the trade. The construction drumbeat is confirmation, not the trigger — the people running this are acting like owners maximizing an asset before a sale, not liquidators clearing one out. The mechanism of the exit is still the capital rule and the senior preferred. The junior preferred I own still have the par anchor: a fixed liquidation preference, trading at a discount, sitting in the right seat when the priority of claims matters again. That's where my net worth is, and that's where it stays.

I'm positioned for direction, not a date.

Focus on the positives. There are a lot of them.

Disclosure: I own Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac junior preferred shares and have been long for years. This is my opinion and analysis, not investment advice. Quotes are attributed to the linked sources. Do your own work.

Keep reading

Found this valuable?

Share it with someone who needs to read it.

Share

Free Tools & Calculators

Interactive tools built by Glen Bradford

Act As If

Question Everything, Set Life Goals, Achieve. — Free PDF download or grab it on Amazon.

Enjoyed this? Get more like it.

Glen's Musings — AI, investing, and building things. Occasional. Free.

Glen Bradford

Glen Bradford

Investor · Builder · Writer

MBA from Purdue. Former hedge fund manager. Holds 26 series of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac junior preferred stock. Built Cloud Nimbus for Salesforce consulting. Author of Act As If. Writes about investing, building things, and the longest financial fraud in American history.

More in Fanniegate

Keep Exploring

Disclaimer: This blog post reflects the author's personal opinions at the time of writing and is not financial, investment, or legal advice. Glen Bradford holds positions in securities discussed on this site. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Do your own research and consult qualified professionals before making investment decisions. Some content on this site was generated or edited with AI assistance.