IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FAIRHOLME FUNDS, INC., ET AL., )
Plaintiffs, )
VS.
CV No. 13-1053
Washington, D.C.
July 18, 2023
2:00 p.m.
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
IN RE FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC )
SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE ) MC No. 13-1288
AGREEMENT CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
)
)

TRANSCRIPT OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROYCE C. LAMBERTH UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. This court is in session; the Honorable Royce C. Lamberth presiding. Please be seated, everyone.

Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Miscellaneous Case No. 13-1288, In Re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action litigations.

Would a member of counsel for each party please approach the lectern and state your appearances for the record.

MR. HUME: Good afternoon, Judge Lamberth. It's Hamish Hume for the Class Plaintiffs.

Shall we have each counsel introduce themselves individually?

THE COURT: Yes, that would be fine.

MR. ZAGAR: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Eric Zagar for the plaintiffs.

MR. RUDY: Hello again, Judge Lamberth.

Lee Rudy for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAMER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

John Ramer for the Berkley Plaintiffs.

MR. KRAVETZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Robert Kravetz on behalf of the plaintiffs.

MR. BARRY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Michael Barry on behalf of plaintiffs.
MR. KAPLAN: Good afternoon. Sam Kaplan on behalf of the plaintiffs.

MR. COLATRIANO: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Vince Colatriano on behalf of the Berkley Plaintiffs.

MR. GOODHART: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Grant Goodhart on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs.

MS. DAVIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Kenya Davis for the Class Plaintiffs.

THE COURT: They let you in again?
MS. DAVIS: Yes, sir.

MR. STERN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Jonathan Stern for FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOFFMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Ian Hoffman also on behalf of the defendants.

MR. JONES: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Stanton Jones also on behalf of the defendants.

MS. VARMA: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Asim Varma on behalf of the defendants.

MR. BERGMAN: Good afternoon. David Bergman from Arnold \& Porter for defendants.

THE COURT: Okay.
I wish $I$ could say it's nice to see you all again, but it's not. But nevertheless I'm here, you're here, so
we'll start with the plaintiffs' pending motions.

I'm not ruling from the bench, but $I$ do expect to get some rulings out in the next couple days.

And whatever you all want to present orally and argue orally, you may this afternoon. I'll hear whatever y'all want to present.

Save some time for the defendants so they can make their arguments on their motions as well, and we'll get as much as we can in today.

MR. ZAGAR: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You can refresh my memory on things. But I'm very happy everybody cooperated in getting this underway with the same law clerk I had who will do his best to refresh my memory on what $I$ did last time.

My mind is not gone. My knee, however, has not improved greatly. So I'm still on my walker and will be through this trial.

But fortunately for me, my mind is -- but I did turn 80 in the meantime this weekend. And so my wife assures me that $I$ should stop; however, I have a younger judge who's told me when my mind goes, he will tell me to step down. And I have told him I will not argue and I will step down when he tells me $I$ should and $I$ will not argue. But $I$ just talked to him again today and he told me he thinks I'm fine and I did not need to step down. So I
wanted to assure myself before $I$ went forward today.

He tells me I'm still sharp, he thinks. So
luckily he was somebody $I$ hired in the
U.S. Attorney's Office and he followed me over here so you probably know who it is. But in any event, he's enough younger that he will tell me when my time has come.

I love the job, I can't step down, I don't want to step down.

Go ahead.

MR. ZAGAR: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Eric Zagar for the plaintiffs.

And happy birthday, and we're glad to have you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

It's hard to believe I could be 80.
Another judge told me, why am I acting like I'm 40 then? I like it.

MR. ZAGAR: In terms of order of presentation, unless Your Honor has a preference, as Your Honor suggested, and we've conferred with defense counsel, plaintiffs will present their affirmative motions first, followed by defendants.

And I can give you the preview of the order if you're interested for what we intend to do.

THE COURT: Yep.
MR. ZAGAR: We will have our motions in limine
regarding the expert up first.

We will then do our omnibus motions more or less in order but not necessarily fully in order.

And then our motion on the Treasury and

White House documents would be our last one.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ZAGAR: In terms of time, Your Honor, we have agreed with defendants to try to split it roughly evenly. So I don't know if Your Honor has a particular idea of how late you want to go tonight.

THE COURT: 5:00-ish.
MR. ZAGAR: We will try to accommodate.
THE COURT: 5:00-ish, I hope.
MR. ZAGAR: Okay. Very good, Your Honor.

So unless Your Honor has any other preliminaries, I'll ask Mr. Kaplan to come up and start with the expert.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. ZAGAR: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Kaplan. Recall you very well.

MR. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And fondly.
As time goes, it's more fond.
MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I will be arguing our motion with respect to Dr. Attari.

And as Your Honor knows, there are two components to that motion. There's the bond event study, and then there's the MBS.

The order we plan to present it -- and this actually works quite well for defense counsel too because they have two people arguing it, is that I'm going to argue the bond event study first, then sit down, let them go, brief rebuttal, and then move on to the MBS.

Your Honor, with respect to the bond event study, it's now clear that the defendants are offering the bond event study for a purpose that it cannot reliably support.

That purpose is as stated, as defense counsel stated in closing argument. You know that from Dr. Attari, who explained to you how his back -- bond event study demonstrated that investor confidence was restored by agreement to the net worth sweep.

The event study simply can't bear that weight, Your Honor. And the reason it can't bear that weight is because we've identified at least one plausible alternative cause for the . 1 point decline in the bond yield spreads that they rely or that Dr. Attari relies on to say that investor confidence was restored.

And that cause is that when the Third Amendment -that the Third Amendment created an expectation of declining -- that there would be future declining supply in
the availability of these bonds, and it, therefore, increased the value of the extant bonds, the bonds that were already out there, including the bonds that Dr. Attari analyzed.

The plaintiffs' principal response to -defendants' principal response to this is to say, Your Honor already decided -- the Court already decided that, this is old news, nothing to see here.

But the Court did not decide that. The Court ruled that it could conceivably, and that was Your Honor's word, be relevant for another purpose that they don't even defend that they didn't offer it for at the last trial. They offered it for the purpose that counsel stated in closing argument, and it just doesn't support that purpose. It's unreliable for that purpose. The jury would be left completely at sea in trying to distinguish between these causes.

And our alternative cause, Your Honor, isn't just a cause that we just made up, it's throughout the documents in this case. It's in their analyst reports; it's in FHFA's own documents. And I'll just read one, but there are many cited in our brief.

It says, "The rationale for the tighter spread," is that, "As the enterprises wind down, there will be less longer term debt issued, leaving investors to fight over
existing supply." That is an alternative cause, it's a confounding [sic] factor, and it is not reliably accounted for by Dr. Attari.

And Your Honor did not conclude otherwise, Your Honor concluded the opposite. Your Honor said Dr. Attari never claims he can isolate the impact of the net worth sweep, much less this notion that the net worth sweep increased investor confidence as opposed to just making people think there would be fewer bonds in the future.

So the defendants, their loan explanation is to say, well, he designed this study to account for this because he only used longer term bonds. That's just not an answer, Your Honor. He has no -- there is no reliable methodology to enable the jury to conclude that that makes any difference whatsoever.

The point is that there's going to be a need for future bonds in the future. The net worth sweep is creating this expectation, the Third Amendment is creating this expectation, and there's no reason to believe that a longer term, shorter term makes a difference. In fact, their own document says, the farther out the maturity, the tighter the spread. This is PX 282, Exhibit $1 G$ to our motion.

And so, Your Honor, their final response is to just resort to the last refuge of somebody offering a reliable opinion -- an unreliable opinion, which is to say,
oh, that you can just cross-examine on that. It goes to weight, it doesn't go to admissibility.

And, of course, one can always cross-examine junk economics, Your Honor; one can always cross-examine an unreliable opinion. But the whole function of Daubert is to keep unreliable opinions out in the first instance.

So I'll let my friend Mr. Hoffman respond.
MR. HOFFMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Ian Hoffman on behalf of the defendants. It's a pleasure and an honor to appear before the Court again.

Your Honor, the vast majority --
THE COURT: It's nice to start that way anyway.

MR. HOFFMAN: I hope it stays that way, Judge.
The vast majority of plaintiffs' motion,

Your Honor, is a rehash of the arguments that were already presented to this Court.

THE COURT: Everything $I$ read was a rehash.
MR. HOFFMAN: Fair enough, Your Honor.
I take it you mean beyond just this motion as well.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. HOFFMAN: But with this one in particular, though, Judge --

THE COURT: I tried not to say "nightmare" but "rehash."

MR. HOFFMAN: Judge, the central attack the first time around is the same attack this time around; that Dr. Attari fails to isolate the impact of one part of the Third Amendment over the other.

That's the same arguments, they cite the same cases, Judge, they cite most of the same documents. All the arguments in the case -- I'm sorry, exhibit examples that Mr. Kaplan referred to is and was fodder for cross-examination at trial.

The only purportedly new element that plaintiffs identify this go-around is a purported representation that defendants' counsel supposedly made in the course of briefing before the first trial.

I didn't hear much of it from Mr. Kaplan this morning, but the thrust of their papers, Judge, is that defendants' counsel did some kind of bait-and-switch; that we told the Court Dr. Attari is going to testify to $X$, the Court issued its ruling, and then he testified to something different.

It's just not true, Your Honor. And I don't know if I need to sort of parse through who said what when, but the highlight, Judge, is that there's really two statements at issue in the prior briefing and the statements are side by side.

The first statement is the one that plaintiffs say
was this representation that we've somehow now violated. And that representation was the straightforward one, which Your Honor also emphasized in the ruling, that Dr. Attari's opinion is that the Third Amendment as a whole caused this change in the bond prices. And we acknowledged, as Dr. Attari acknowledged, that an event study by itself can't isolate these two different parts of the Third Amendment that were part of the same announcement.

However, Judge, the very next sentence in our brief states, "And Dr. Attari properly concluded that the decline he observed in the bond yields following that announcement supports his conclusion that the Third Amendment alleviated market participants' concerns about erosion of the Treasury commitment."

So that is what $I$ heard Mr. Kaplan arguing, that is suddenly the new thing, that Dr. Attari testified at trial and that we emphasized in closing that Dr. Attari -that event study supported Dr. Attari's conclusion that the Third Amendment as a whole alleviated market concern.

There was no bait-and-switch, Judge, because that's exactly what we said in the papers. And it's not just what we said in the papers, it's what Dr. Attari said in his report. Your Honor, in issuing its ruling, I note, didn't cite counsel's argument for its ruling, it cited Dr. Attari's report.

So his testimony at trial was consistent with his report, our arguments, which just matched his report, and the Court's ruling. And the Court ruled that all of these criticisms about Dr. Attari's event study are and can be the subject of cross-examination. And they were. And that is how it should play out in the coming trial as well. There's no bait-and-switch, Your Honor.

And as for closing argument, again -- let me back up and make one other point, Judge.

Throughout his testimony at trial, Dr. Attari consistently testified that the Third Amendment, the Third Amendment caused the price decline, which is exactly what we briefed. It's also -- and he also testified that the Third Amendment alleviated market concern. That's also what we argued in closing.

They also jump up and down in closing that my partner, Mr. Stern, said at one point that the net worth sweep alleviated market concern. And they say, a-ha, that somehow means that you're using Dr. Attari's opinion in an event study for an improper purpose.

Your Honor, as an initial matter, it's a fair -as an initial matter, the remedy for closing argument that doesn't match the evidence is not to exclude more evidence, it's to direct counsel to conform his closing to the evidence. But here it was a fair summary of the evidence
because of Dr. Attari's testimony.
The Court should deny plaintiffs' motion and allow Dr. Attari to testify as to the bond event study just as he did in the first trial. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, as we said, their sole response is, nothing to see here, because Your Honor has already ruled on it.

But Your Honor didn't rule on it. If you look at Your Honor's prior opinion, Your Honor did not rule that there's a reliable way to distinguish between the reduced supply rationale for the decline in the yield spread and the improved creditworthiness rationale that they offer.

And it wasn't just counsel's -- counsel didn't misspeak in closing argument, he summarized exactly what Dr. Attari said in his testimony.

And this is exactly what they're arguing. They're not just arguing it was the Third Amendment. That wouldn't even be relevant. What they're arguing is that it was the net worth sweep that restored investor confidence. There's no reliable basis for that.

You didn't hear a single thing from opposing counsel defending the reliability of the opinion in that regard. All he said was, nothing to see here. And there's lots to see here, Your Honor, and Your Honor didn't rule on it previously.

I'll move on now, Your Honor, to the MBS part of our motion with respect to Dr. Attari.

And there are two components to this. One is, we're asking the Court to exclude Dr. Attari from opining and defendants from arguing that the net worth sweep reassured the MBS market, the MBS investors, and that there was concern among MBS investors.

This goes even beyond the bond event study, Your Honor, because in this instance, they offer no quantitative data at all.

I'm going to start with the opinion that it reassured -- that the net worth sweep reassured MBS investors.

There's nothing at all to support the view that the -- there's no quantitative information at all to support the view that MBS investors were somehow reassured by the net worth sweep. They don't even -- they didn't even do the sort of event study.

They do argue that it's a reasonable inference from the bond event study that the MBS market also would have been reassured.

But as we've shown, Your Honor, they can't even -the bond event study cannot even reliably show that the \$30 billion of long term bonds were somehow reassured. It is not even remotely -- there's no reliable basis whatsoever
that's proffered from -- jumping from that to a market that's a $\$ 30$ billion, to a market that's a $\$ 5$ trillion, the MBS market.

Their own document, Your Honor, said that trading in MBS showed that the net worth sweep was a non-event. So all of the evidence, Your Honor, if anything, shows the opposite.

But, of course, for Daubert purposes, the principal point is that there's no reliable basis for this opinion. They just -- they referred to a couple of analyst reports that really don't even say that the MBS market was reassured, they just kind of parrot their theory.

They say that the commitment -- that the net worth sweep means that the commitment won't be exhausted as quickly, and that's it. That is not a basis for saying, as Mr. Stern argued Dr. Attari's opinion was in closing, that the market breathed a sigh of relief. They do nothing to separately provide a basis for claiming -- for providing a reliability basis for asserting that the MBS market was reassured.

Moving to the first -- to the pre net worth sweep, the notion that there was concern among the MBS market, it's a similar point, Your Honor. There's no quantitative information. All the quantitative information is on our side, which shows increased bond -- increased MBS issuances
over the prior year, reports that say that this is going to be a good year for MBS. Absolutely nothing that could provide a reliable basis for Dr. Attari to opine specifically about MBS investors and that there was widespread concern.

Again, all he does is refer to an analyst report, frankly an analyst report that didn't even -- that even pre-dated the good economic news of 2012. And that just sort of parrots their theory. That is not a reliable basis to make the kind of sweeping statements that they make on page -- and that we outline on page 23 of our brief, Your Honor. So I'll let my friend Mr. Bergman respond.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BERGMAN: David Bergman for defendants, Your Honor.

I understand plaintiffs to be primarily critiquing Dr. Attari for failing to isolate the MBS market from the bond market.

In fact, Dr. Attari did not lump them together or conflate them indiscriminately. He addressed the MBS and bond markets and MBS and bond investors separately at trial.

He explained the different characteristics of bonds and MBS.

He explained the Fannie and Freddie guarantees.
And he explained where the bonds and the MBS are
in the capital structure.

He explained the relationships among MBS bonds and equity.

And he explained how the Treasury commitment was important to each.

He explained how and why the MBS and bond investors faced similar risks and how they shared similar concerns.

The analyst reports reflect all of this.
Dr. Attari cited some analyst reports that addressed expressly both MBS and debt. Others not expressly but speak broadly of market concerns and reactions to potential credit downgrades and the like, all relevant to both MBS and bond investors, and Dr. Attari explained that. Other analyst reports address more broadly the financial condition, and Dr. Attari connected the dots between those reports and specific concerns of both MBS and bondholders.

Some of the examples of analyst reports that expressly identified both MBS and debtholders, some are before the Third Amendment, that's the Deutsche Bank, Barclays, $B$ of $A$, all from the Third Amendment.

And then some are after the Third Amendment. So as Mr. Kaplan delineated, some are explaining there was concern in the market before the Third Amendment. Others
explain that after the Third Amendment, those concerns have been alleviated. Those are -- again, after the Third Amendment, there's a Barclays, RBC Capital, JPMorgan, Amherst Securities, others.

This is not a quantitative analysis, Mr. Kaplan is surely right about that. But it's a qualitative analysis. And Dr. Attari testified that it is typical of the work that experts in his field do to review analyst reports from the time of events and try to study what they mean.

We cited similar cases that have -- we cite cases that have admitted similar expert analysis. The SEC v. Ustian case was a market awareness survey. That's very similar to what Dr. Attari did here. Not statistical. It was a survey for the same kind of purpose that Dr. Attari had.

The Gray case, similar, a review and summary of analyst reports to show contemporaneous sense of the markets, is what the Court said there.

This is not cherry-picking. Cherry-picking implies that Dr. Attari was disregarding adverse evidence. Plaintiffs haven't cited anything to the contrary, they haven't pointed to any reports that say that the Third Amendment hurt the credit or upset the markets.

And I don't hear plaintiffs alleging that Barclay's, B of A, Deutsche Bank, RBC and others are
outliers and not credible.
Finally, I will say the Court addressed similar arguments from plaintiffs in connection with trial one. Not specific to this case, but it was a challenge to a different expert, Dr. Kothari's use of public information, including analyst reports, made the same kind of arguments that the plaintiffs are making here.

The Court denied that motion in limine, said that an expert can provide specialized context for understanding how to connect the dots, placing context especially where testimony concerns matters that are arguably beyond the average juror's comprehension.

Your Honor, that reasoning applies here. It was correct then and it is correct now. Thank you.

THE COURT: Where did I do that?

MR. BERGMAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, that was in connection with the October 2022 motion in limine decision in trial one.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BERGMAN: I have a Westlaw cite if Your Honor needs it.

THE COURT: That's all right.

MR. BERGMAN: Thank you. Thank you.
MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I'll just to be very clear about what this motion is about. I will be appearing
before you later to talk about our separate motion on analyst reports.

But this motion is about the specific opinion that the net worth sweep reassured mortgage-backed security holders, and that there was concern among mortgage-backed security holders.

And what we didn't hear at all from Mr. Bergman was any rebuttal of that point. He attacked a strawman that said -- or said we were making an argument that Dr. Attari never talks about those two groups of investors separately. That is not our argument, Your Honor.

And our argument is not that Dr. Attari should be prohibited from talking about MBS investors, talking about bond investors and/or be prohibited from offering his opinions in toto or anything like that.

It is very specific to the fact that there is no reliable basis for him to say that mortgage-backed securities holders were reassured that they saw -- that they were concerned about this risk or that -- and that the net worth sweep reassured them.

It doesn't even -- Mr. Bergman says this is a qualitative analysis. That's another way of saying, Your Honor, that it takes a few snippets from a couple of analyst reports and throws them down as the basis for his opinion.

There is nothing here to suggest -- and, again, all the quantitative evidence is to the contrary. There's nothing to suggest a reliable basis for those two specific opinions with respect to MBS investors that we are seeking to exclude with this motion. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. RAMER: Good afternoon. John Ramer on behalf of plaintiffs.

We're going to be turning to plaintiffs' omnibus MIL now. And I'm going to be starting with MIL No. 4, which concerns the deposition testimony of former Freddie Mac CEO Mr. Layton regarding an alleged meeting he had with representatives from the major mortgage securities dealer, Credit Suisse.

And according to Mr. Layton, representatives from Credit Suisse told him that they had concerns about the possibility of an erosion to the Treasury commitment should a borrowing cap under the PSPAs be implemented going into 2013.

And as Your Honor certainly recalls, this issue arose at trial one. And Your Honor permitted defendants to introduce these Credit Suisse statements based on two assertions made by defendants: The first was that defendants were not offering the Credit Suisse statements for the truth of the matter asserted, but, rather, for the
effect on Mr. Layton. And the second was that there was some evidence that Mr. Layton relayed the concerns of Credit Suisse to FHFA. As it turned out, however, neither assertion held up at trial one.

For starters, at closing, defendants were arguing, as we've already heard today, that part of Mr. DeMarco's motivation for adopting the net worth sweep was due to alleged market concern regarding the potential erosion of the Treasury commitment should the borrowing cap take effect.

And during closing, counsel displayed a slide quoting Mr. Layton's deposition testimony to, in defense counsel's words, confirm and corroborate Mr. DeMarco's testimony regarding that fact.

Defense counsel then read from the slide with Mr. Layton's deposition testimony and then stopped and said to the jury, "Here is the most important part of this." Defense counsel then proceeded to read the Credit Suisse statements and said to the jury, "So this is the investors themselves saying that summer that they had a concern." And defense counsel underscored the point saying, "That's how you know, members of the jury, that the circular draw and the problem of erosion is not just a plot by Mr. DeMarco or a figment of his imagination." This is Mr. Layton. "This is Credit Suisse. This is the entire market expressing
these concerns."

In other words, according to defense counsel, the jury didn't need to take Mr. DeMarco's word for it because Credit Suisse thought the exact same thing. And I think then the defendants transparently offered the Credit Suisse statements for the truth of the matter asserted.

And on the second point with respect to whether Mr. Layton relayed Credit Suisse's concerns to FHFA, throughout the entirety of trial one, defendants offered zero evidence that the Credit Suisse statements were ever relayed to FHFA.

And now still all they offer is a document with some vague reference to investors in meeting agenda talking points, yet Mr. DeMarco never mentioned Credit Suisse, no one from FHFA mentioned Credit Suisse.

And I think perhaps most telling was Mr. Layton's response during his deposition when he was asked if he could remember whether anyone from FHFA -- yeah, whether anyone from FHFA was at the Credit Suisse meeting. And he said no.

But then notice what he did not say. He did not say, no, but $I$ told Ed DeMarco the following day; nor did he say, no, but during our weekly meetings, I, of course, relayed what Credit Suisse said to me.

Instead, he said, no, I was told that
Credit Suisse was, "making the rounds in Washington, and so

I was left with the impression that Credit Suisse met with FHFA." So Mr. Layton didn't even suggest that he told anyone at FHFA about Credit Suisse.

And I'll just close with one final point, Your Honor, which is, at trial one, Your Honor correctly precluded defendants from offering hearsay statements contained in securities analyst reports.

And defendants were making the exact same argument that they're making here, which is that they weren't offering the statements for the truth of the matter asserted, they were offering them to show the effect on FHFA's decision-making.

And Your Honor correctly rejected that argument, because there was no evidence that anyone at FHFA actually relied on the specific statements that defendants intended to offer.

And the exact same is true here. There's no evidence that anyone at FHFA considered or relied upon the specific Credit Suisse statements made to Mr. Layton, and so we think the results should be the same and defendants should be precluded from offering the Credit Suisse statements.

MR. BERGMAN: Your Honor, David Bergman again for defendants.

This is the same objection, same argument that we
all heard in trial one.

Mr. Layton's testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter, it was not offered to try to show that the Treasury commitment would, in fact, be eroded. It wasn't even offered to say that Credit Suisse had a genuine belief of that. It was offered for the purpose of showing that Credit Suisse said this. And Mr. Layton was, as Your Honor ruled, a key person, he heard it, and it affected his thinking.

Mr. Layton may not have -- he did not testify at trial that he told this to Mr. DeMarco. He wasn't asked that. Mr. Layton was a good deponent and he answered the questions he was asked.

But he did testify that he had weekly meetings with Mr. DeMarco. He did testify that it was his belief that Mr. DeMarco was aware of this and may have met with Credit Suisse.

And as I say, Mr. Layton was CEO of Freddie Mac; weekly meetings with Mr. DeMarco. There's also an agenda for a meeting among Mr. Layton, Mr. DeMarco, and Treasury from June 26th, 2012, approximately the time that he fixed his -- the Credit Suisse meeting, and that agenda includes discussion of market concern over erosion of the Treasury commitment.

Dr. Dharan, plaintiffs' expert, has conceded that

FHFA was monitoring analysts and market commentators and market participants. And Mr. DeMarco testified he was aware generally of market concerns and concerned about them.

In this context, especially where plaintiffs have argued that the concern about erosion of the Treasury commitment is a mere pretext, it is important and really probative to be able to show that market -- key market participants like Credit Suisse were expressing these concerns to key players like Mr. Layton. So this is appropriate evidence offered for a non-hearsay purpose and ask that, as in trial one, Your Honor permit use of that testimony. Thank you.

MR. RAMER: Just some -- a couple of brief points, Your Honor.

First, I don't think there's -- you can reasonably read the transcript or have reasonably sat in the courtroom and not think that the defendants were offering the Credit Suisse statements for the truth of the matter asserted the way they were presented to the jury. And the way they were presented to the jury was, here is how you know this is true; Credit Suisse thought it, too.

And with respect to whether this was ever passed on to $F H F A$, defendants really just fall back to this idea that, oh, well, they were aware of concerns generally. But that's not the relevant standard, Your Honor, that's not the
correct legal standard that Your Honor adopted with respect to the securities analyst reports, which is that the specific reports had to be considered by FHFA. And you can search the testimony of folks from FHFA; there's zero mention of Credit Suisse at trial one.

And then the last point is, Mr. Bergman stressed how important it is to defendants to prove this point. That doesn't allow them to bring the hearsay in; it's got to be admissible evidence. And the point -- that is why it is so prejudicial to have defense be able to invoke the imprimatur of Credit Suisse to the jury to support their argument for why Mr. DeMarco adopted the net worth sweep.

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, Sam Kaplan arguing the MIL on analyst reports.

Your Honor, there are two issues here that were -six analyst reports that were -- played some role at trial. Two were admitted and four were -- they were allowed to be displayed to the jury through Dr. Attari's testimony, and those, of course, present different issues, and so I will address them separately.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAPLAN: I'll begin with the two that were admitted into evidence.

And let's start with Your Honor's ruling on analyst reports, which neither party challenges.

It says: "Defendants may not offer the securities analyst reports unless they can show that any specific report factored into FHFA's decision-making process."

Now, on the first two, I will note that the defendants correctly note that they haven't yet tried to introduce these reports at this trial, they haven't laid the foundation. But they have argued that the foundation that they laid at the prior trial would be enough, and that is wrong, and let me explain why.

They have to show that it factored into FHFA's decision-making process, the specific report did. One of them is a March 14 th, 2012 , report that was forwarded to Mr. DeMarco from -- by Mario Giulietti with the comment: "A reasonable summary, $I$ am noting, as your appearance in New York is listed right before this piece."

What he is saying there, Your Honor, is that the only reason he's forwarding this report to Mr. DeMarco is because a page on top of the analyst report says that Mr. DeMarco will soon be appearing at a Deutsche Bank conference.

And sure enough, if you look at that analyst report, on top of it is an itinerary or a schedule for the conference. There is zero evidence that that report figured into the decision-making process on the net worth sweep. It was from March 2012. Mr. DeMarco never said he relied on it
in any way, shape, or form, never even said he read it. For all we know, he looked at the first page and said, hey, there's my name and threw it in the trash. We just don't know. And so that is not adequate foundation under Your Honor's ruling.

The other report, you can tell right off the bat that there's not adequate foundation for factoring into the decision-making process, because it was at -- it's attached to a meeting notice that post-dated Mr. DeMarco's having made the decision on the net worth sweep. It didn't actually post-date the net worth sweep itself which was -or at least its announcement, which was on August 17 th , but it was on August 15th, and Mr. DeMarco had made his decision before then. And there's no, again, testimony from Mr. DeMarco that he relied on it.

And I will note, Your Honor, that though Your Honor did admit these at the prior trial, Your Honor never ruled on the basis of -- that it met Your Honor's prior standard. There was a lot of -- the analyst reports caused a bit of confusion at the last trial. And when these came in, it was actually right before Dr. Attari's testimony and about what reports he could rely on.

And Your Honor said, "The objections will be overruled, there are proper bases for the opinion, and the documents are admissible as part of the expert's opinion and
in support of his opinion. All right. As soon as the jury is ready, then we will proceed." But Your Honor never applied Your Honor's prior standard to those two reports. Now, what ended up happening was the defendants treated it as if two had been admitted for all purposes and the rest could just be disclosed as would be permitted under Rule 703. But Your Honor's never ruled applying that prior standard to those two reports. And once Your Honor does, they can't be admitted under that standard.

So that leaves the question about whether it is proper for Dr. Attari to disclose these analyst reports and then for the defendants to talk about them in closing, to disclose their content in the closing argument.

And, Your Honor, again, this is a narrow question, because we're not -- we're not saying that Dr. Attari can't rely on the analyst reports, but what we are saying is that they have not met the specific standard under Rule 703 for disclosing facts and data that would otherwise be inadmissible. That standard is highly demanding, it is: "Facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible. The proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative effect in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." "Substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."

And, Your Honor, they don't even try to meet that
standard in opposing our motion. I don't even think they mention it. And they can't meet that standard with these analyst reports.

We know what the prejudicial effect is of these analyst reports. They're rank hearsay, and there's an extreme risk that the jury is going to read -- just read the analyst reports, hear what they said, and just view them as another expert testifying in this trial, but one that we cannot cross-examine, one that we cannot cross-examine about the 2012 profits, the strong economic fundamentals, the payment in kind, the deferred tax assets. All of the types of issues that are at issue in this case, these witnesses are -- these are effectively witnesses who will be absent from this case that we cannot cross-examine. And so that's the prejudicial effect.

And what's the probative value? It's just repeating what Dr. Attari's opinion is. Dr. Attari's opinion is this was reasonable for Mr. DeMarco to do this for the reasons that Mr. DeMarco said.

And we're not saying he can't offer that opinion. But what we are saying is he can't bring in his buddies for -- I'm not saying they're really buddies, but his -these analyst reports as sort of quasi-experts that we can't cross-examine.

His opinion can be evaluated without looking at
them. And under any circumstances, the probative value of the -- I'm sorry, his opinion can be evaluated without analyst reports. And he can even say, I relied on analyst reports, $I$ relied on this, $I$ relied on that.

But what we're talking about is reading these analyst reports into the record, reading them to the jury, effectively giving a book report on analyst reports. He can talk about all those things Mr. Bergman said that he talked about, the difference between bond investors and mortgage-backed securities investors, all of these things. But he cannot -- they cannot meet the demanding standard of Rule 703 for getting these analyst reports -- for having him read those analyst reports to the jury effectively. An expert opinion is more than -- is not a vehicle, it's not a conduit for hearsay. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BERGMAN: Your Honor, David Bergman again. With respect to the two documents, DX412 and DX529 that were admitted, and our understanding is the Court did admit them in trial one, they certainly were -- to my knowledge, everyone understood they were admitted and they were presented to the jury as available to the jury. THE COURT: What were the numbers again? MR. BERGMAN: DX412 and DX529. And they were properly admitted because it was apparent that they were considered by Mr. DeMarco.

DX412, as Mr. Kaplan said, is sent from
Mr. Ugoletti to Mr. DeMarco by email. It's also identified in Mr. Ugoletti's declaration that was admitted into evidence in trial one.

And Mr. Ugoletti said, "FHFA considered market analyst reports, watched and looked out for them, considered them when making its decisions," and then identified specifically two reports, one of which is a Deutsche Bank report.

The second is the DX529. That's in August 15, so a couple days before the Third Amendment is signed.

Mr. Kaplan says, well, surely, Mr. DeMarco had made up his mind. But until that document is signed, anybody can walk away; this is true in any contract.

And so Mr. DeMarco had testified very clearly that he had a holistic approach, he considered a lot of different information. Specifically, he considered analyst reports. He got emails from his staff. He met with people. And so those two documents, $I$ believe the Court got it exactly right. They have Mr. DeMarco's fingerprints on them, Your Honor, and they are appropriately admitted for substantive evidence.

With respect to the four documents that plaintiffs have identified as documents that Dr. Attari relied upon and the Court permitted him to disclose to the jury, again, the

Court was exactly correct, Mr. -- Dr. Attari's analysis was reliable for the reasons that $I$ described earlier in connection with the first motion in limine.

Rule 703 permits disclosure to the jury, whereas here the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. That is clearly the case here.

Dr. Dharan testified that there were no real market concerns. Dr. Attari says there were market concerns.

How is a jury to resolve that if it can't assess the basis for those opinions? And we cited cases in our opposition page 30 that have said, it's fair to disclose to the jury where it is more probative than prejudicial. It's obviously Hornbook law. But that's the case here.

And, again, Your Honor, relevant to this would be the Court's earlier motion in limine decision with respect to Dr. Kothari. And I now do have a cite, so maybe I'll save the Court ten seconds. It's 2002 WL 13937460 at Star 3.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What was the cite again?

Can you give me the cite again?

MR. BERGMAN: Oh, sorry, Your Honor yes.

2002 WL 13937460 at Star 3. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Kaplan.

MR. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, as to DX412 and DX529, first, hopefully it was clear, those documents were admitted, we were not saying they did anything wrong --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. KAPLAN: -- by relying on them in closing. Our only point was that, in the way they were admitted, Your Honor did not end up applying your prior standard to those documents.

As for Mr. DeMarco relying on them, one rhetorical question that $I$ would ask is, why didn't he testify about them if he relied on them. He testified for a really long time. He didn't -- but he didn't mention those documents as something that he relied on.

They also could have called Mr. Ugoletti, but they didn't call Mr. Ugoletti.

They're trying to rely on these documents on their face to say he relied on them, and they can't do that. They don't say on their face that Mr. DeMarco relied on them.

Moving to the reports, first of all, I would note that my friend, Mr. Bergman, he didn't even articulate the standard accurately in his argument. And he omitted the word "substantially," that it's got to be substantially more probative than prejudicial to disclose this.

This is a highly demanding standard. But they
don't -- they also don't show that it's more prejudicial than probative [sic].

Counsel asks how is -- counsel asks rhetorically: How could he possibly prove his opinion without relying on the analyst reports? The answer, Your Honor, is by talking about his opinion with reference to the things that Mr. DeMarco actually relied on, and saying it was reasonable in light of those things. Nothing that we have done or that we have argued would prevent him from doing that. If you combine our arguments, what we're saying is that he can't offer an unreliable event study to do it, and he can't just be a conduit for reading things into the record that we cannot cross-examine.

And by the way, Your Honor, one other reason that that they're not that probative is that the analyst reports don't have access. It's not just -- the fact that we can't cross-examine them is important, but the analyst reports also don't even have access to the things that Mr. DeMarco had access to or at least all of it.

This is another reason that they're really not that probative of anything. They're just paragraphs that say something they like that is -- that resembles their theory of the case. And they use it to bolster, well, if that analyst said Deutsche Bank guy said it, then that makes two of them, Mr. -- Dr. Attari said it and the Deutsche Bank
guy. And that's just not permitted under Rule 703, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ZAGAR: Eric Zagar for the plaintiffs,
Your Honor.

I will be addressing plaintiffs' motions in limine No. 6 and 7, which are our motions to exclude the forward-looking statements in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's SEC filings, and to exclude Ross Kari, the former CFO of Freddie Mac, his testimony about those statements.

This is not something that Your Honor ruled on in the first trial, this is a new one.

We have moved to exclude the statements and -excuse me, the forward-looking statements in the SEC filings and the testimony about them on the grounds of hearsay.

And defendants don't dispute that the statements would be hearsay unless they qualify for one or more exceptions. They point to two that they say they're qualified for.

Their principal argument is that the forward-looking statements in the SEC filings qualify as business records under Rule 803(6).

But they have a serious problem, which is that they can't lay the foundation that they need to qualify for business records.

Subsection A, Rule $803(6)(A)$, requires evidence that the record, in this case, the forward-looking statements, was made at or near the time by or from information transmitted by someone with knowledge.

There is no evidence of that whatsoever. There is no testimony from anyone about who made these statements, what knowledge said person or persons had, nor what information they relied on, nor who transmitted it to them.

It's not even clear, frankly, whether these statements originated with someone at Fannie and Freddie or someone at the FHFA, because Mr. Satriano, the chief accountant, acknowledged that the FHFA had final authority to approve or disapprove and make changes to the SEC filings before they are filed. So there is literally no evidence of the origin, the process, anything about where these statements came from, how they came to be, or who made them. THE COURT: Which motion is this now?

MR. ZAGAR: This is plaintiffs' omnibus No. 6 and 7 .

THE COURT: What's the ECF number? Do you have that handy?

MR. ZAGAR: It's Berkeley ECF No. 307.
THE COURT: 3-0?

MR. ZAGAR: 307.

THE COURT: Okay.

Okay. Go ahead.
MR. ZAGAR: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
So Subsection A, there is literally no evidence on it whatsoever, so they can't meet that requirement.

They further have a problem that, under Subsection D of Rule 803(6), which says that all of these conditions, A, B, and C must be shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness or by certification.

The only potential witness who even might even be plausible to satisfy the requirements of Subsection $D$ would be Mr. Satriano, the chief accountant of FHFA. But he is clearly not the custodian of Fannie and Freddie's records, and he is also not a qualified witness.

The case law makes it very clear that a qualified witness must be able to testify about the recordkeeping system of the organization at issue and must be able to vouch that the requirements of Subsections $A, B$, and $C$ were met.

Mr. Satriano is not qualified. He certainly has some general knowledge about how Fannie and Freddie compile their SEC filings. But he was in no position to vouch that the requirements were met.

There's no indication that he even has any personal knowledge of the necessary information, such as all the information for Subsection A about who made the
statements, what information they relied on, et cetera. He offered no testimony about his knowledge of that or even indicated that he had any such knowledge.

Without a witness and without being able to lay the foundation through that witness, they simply don't qualify for the business records exception.

Their secondary, and, I would say, far-distant second argument, is that even if it's not admissible under Rule 803(6) as a business record, it qualifies under the residual exception of Rule 807 , and that just is clearly not the case.

If it doesn't qualify under Rule 803(6), there's simply no way that they could get it in under Rule 807, which requires "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness." The whole problem is they don't have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, and that's why it's not admissible as a business record or anything else.

So, Your Honor, both the statements in the SEC filings and Mr. Kari's testimony about those statements, they're hearsay, there's no exception, they should be excluded.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, Ian Hoffman once again on behalf of the defendants.

As the Court knows, Your Honor, SEC filings are incredibly reliable documents by their very nature. Because
of the legal duties underlying their preparation and the potential consequences of misstatements, they're prepared with --

THE COURT: You can be prosecuted.
MR. HOFFMAN: Exactly, they can be prosecuted, Your Honor.

And that's, ironically, a situation with another motion which I didn't hear addressed yet but we can address at the appropriate time.

But, yes, because the signers, Your Honor, can be prosecuted there, they have all the hallmarks of reliability and indicias of reliability, and there's more than enough foundation here to meet both the business records exception and the Residual Exception.

Your Honor, the SEC filings are paradigmatic examples of business records. Courts regularly find that they're admissible under Rule 803(6) as outlined by the various cases cited in our briefs.

It sounds like now plaintiffs might be making a distinction between some parts of the SEC filings can be admissible under the business record sections like the numbers but not other parts of SEC filings, the forward-looking statements. They cite no cases or authority for any such distinction, and all the cases that we cite in our briefs admit those SEC filings in their entirety and not
segmenting out certain portions or not.

Here, Your Honor, the SEC filings easily meet all four elements of Rule 803(6).

It appears there's no dispute as to two elements, that is, $803(6)(B)$ and $803(6)(C)$. And as Your Honor knows, those are elements that are -- the record has to be kept in the course of regularly conducted activity of the business, and making the record was a regular practice of that activity.

Your Honor, SEC filings by their very nature are regular, they're maintained by the business, they're publicly available for shareholders and the rest of the public on the SEC's website, as well as Fannie and Freddie's website, and they happen quarterly. So for $B$ and $C$, there isn't any dispute and I didn't hear argument or see any briefing on that either.

So that only leaves elements A, 803(6)(A), and (D). Here, there is ample evidence for both.

The SEC filings were made at the time by someone with knowledge. They were signed by the CFOs, Your Honor, the CFOs of both companies.

Plaintiffs say there is no evidence in the record, Your Honor. But there is not only evidence in the record, there was trial testimony on this very point.

And if Your Honor would allow just to put this
issue absolutely to bed, I will hand up some trial transcript excerpts and a deposition transcript excerpt.

I've provided a copy to plaintiffs as well, Your Honor.

And I've highlighted in those portions,

Your Honor, the relevant pieces for Your Honor and -- the Court's reference at the appropriate time.

But first I'll say -- I'll address -- there's three witnesses at issue here, three witnesses who all testified about SEC filings. And not just about the truthfulness of what's in those filings but their knowledge about them.

You heard from Mr. Satriano at trial, FHFA's chief accountant. And he testified, "We look at the financial disclosures. That's the things -- those are the kinds of documents we spent a lot of time reviewing and commenting on to ensure completeness and transparency."

He testified that "The Fannie and Freddie management have the obligation to draft them in the first instance and they undergo a robust review there." This was his testimony. "And then they go to Mr. Satriano for review. They do their own robust review and sign off on them through FHA's own process. And then the CFOs of Fannie and Freddie themselves sign off on them, and sign off on them under potential criminal prosecution for false and
knowingly false statements."

Here, Your Honor, Ross Kari testified at trial, albeit through an actor, through a deposition readout, Your Honor. But he testified at trial, "I was responsible for managing the process that was focusing on ensuring the accuracy of the financial statements. It's the $10-\mathrm{Ks}$ " -and he defined what he meant by financial statements. "It's the 10-Ks and 10-Qs, and it's also the earnings release." He plainly has knowledge, and he has knowledge required by law, Judge, to sign this.

Ms. McFarland, in her deposition, said, she was "familiar with our financial results." This is in all the materials that $I$ handed up, Your Honor. And she said she "Reviewed the SEC filings to get comfortable and ultimately sign off on those financials."

All this testimony, Your Honor, readily proves that the filings were made both by someone with knowledge at the company, the CFOs overseeing their teams, as well as by Mr. Satriano with his knowledge of the company and his team's knowledge of all of it. That's element A.

Element D, Your Honor, follows the same course: Are the elements of the exception shown by a custodian or another qualified witness.

Here, there are three custodians or qualified witnesses: Mr. Satriano, Mr. Kari, and Ms. McFarland.

Mr. Kari and Ms. McFarland signed these documents. So their testimony, Judge, about their knowledge of what's in there and their review of them and their signing them is more than enough to lay this foundation.

And if Your Honor recalls, in addition to giving testimony, Judge, that they were familiar with the contents, they also gave testimony that they were accurate. They walked through them; they said, that's my signature, and it was accurate at the time.

That Mr. Satriano works for FHFA and not Fannie and Freddie doesn't mean he's not a qualified witness, Judge. This Court has recognized that a qualified witness is "interpreted broadly, and a witness can be qualified to lay the foundation even if the records were created by another entity."

I have a copy of the case, Your Honor, but I can give you the cite. It's United States v. Al-Imam. That's A-l-I-m-a-m. The case is 382 F.Supp.3d 51 at pincite 59. That's just standing for the principle, Your Honor, that -qualified witness under $803(6)(\mathrm{D})$ can be broad, it doesn't have to be the person who made the record. All it has to be is someone who's familiar as to how it was created.

Your Honor, $I$ don't have to remind you that FHFA is the conservator of Fannie and Freddie, and Mr. Satriano is deeply familiar with the processes as to what goes on at

Fannie and Freddie, as well as at FHFA. He's clearly qualified. And so, Your Honor, each of the elements is met here from the mouth of the signers themselves.

Your Honor, these documents are also, I'll submit, paradigmatic examples to meet the rigorous standard under the residual exception to the hearsay rule.

As the cases we cite in our brief indicate, including the Pattison case, they are eligible for the Residual Exception.

Plaintiffs in their brief say the 807 is reserved for documents that are very important and very reliable.

And, Your Honor, I think that is a good characterization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's SEC filings. They are both very important and very reliable.

And because of all of the "guarantees of trustworthiness," as the Pattison case points out, that are embedded here in the process of the filings, it's more than enough to meet the Residual Exception here. There's a clear legal duty to prepare accurate SEC filings, and false statements can result in civil and criminal penalties, Your Honor. That's more than enough here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, brief indulgence. Let me see if my counsel, make sure I didn't miss something.

Thank you. That's all for now.

MR. ZAGAR: I'll try to be brief, Your Honor.
In terms of the statements potentially giving rise to liability, they qualify for the safe harbor for forward-looking statements. The whole point in safe harbor is that you can't be held liable if you give adequate cautionary language. And there's no dispute that Fannie and Freddie did, so that's a non-issue.

In terms of the statements' so-called reliability, again, let me be specific about the statements we're talking about. They're the statements like following: Our expectation that although we may experience period-to-period volatility in earnings and comprehensive income, we will not generate net income or comprehensive income in excess of our annual dividend obligations to Treasury over the long term.

Our expectation that over time our dividend obligation to Treasury will increasingly drive our future draws under the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement. Our expectation that sometime in future corridors, we will be able to generate comprehensive income sufficient to cover at least a portion.

So this is all about expectations of the future, not financial statements based on audited numbers or even reviewed numbers. That's not what we're talking about here. We're talking about the forward-looking statements of expectation about what we think is going to happen in the
future.
And the rule is not about who signed off on the statements. The rule is about who made the statements.

I don't hear Mr. Hoffman saying that Mr. Satriano or Ms. McFarland or Mr. Kari sat down at the keyboard and typed out these statements from their own mind. Yes, they obviously reviewed them. But whether they are the maker of the statement, of every statement in a multi-hundred-page document, there's no evidence of that.

And finally, when Mr. Hoffman says the statements are reliable, they're in an SEC statement, they must be reliable, well, the very first page of one of the $10-Q s$ says -- this is Fannie Mae's 10-Q filed on August 8th of 2012. Very first page: "This report contains forward-looking statements that are based on management's current expectations and that are subject to significant uncertainties and changes in circumstances." So they say right upfront these statements are not necessarily reliable, we're making predictions about the future, we might not be correct.
So the so-called inherent reliability of these statements, because they happen to be in an SEC filing, is actually quite the reverse. They are inherently unreliable because they're just predictions about the future that they acknowledge, this kind of cautionary language, that they
might not turn out to be true.

So the fact that people reviewed them at a high level doesn't tell you anything about what the origin of these statements is, and it certainly doesn't tell you anything about the truth of these statements, which is what they're trying to use it for. They should be excluded as hearsay.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, if I may be heard briefly.

Mr. Zagar addressed a motion that $I$ didn't hear him address actually in his opening so I didn't respond to it so I'd like to respond to that and just a couple discrete points just directly in response to what he said just now.

So this issue about forward-looking statements, it was the subject of an entire sort of subsection of their motion, and $I$ believe it was just repeated in shorthand here by Mr. Zagar.

In their opening brief, plaintiffs argued at length that false statements in SEC filings cannot expose anyone, forward-looking statements in SEC filings cannot expose anyone to civil or criminal liability so long as they're forward looking and they have these caveats. And the basis for that argument is the so-called safe harbor provision in the law.

Plaintiffs are simply wrong on the point, and they don't even contest as much in their reply. The safe harbor provision, Your Honor, comes from the PSLRA. As Your Honor well knows, that is the private-label securities reform act.

Private, it applies to one species of civil claims brought by private parties. It does not apply to any government causes of action, including any criminal action here. So the notion, which, again, I think was just repeated by Mr. Zagar, that forward-looking statements cannot be the basis for civil liability, let alone a criminal conviction because of the safe harbor provision of the private act is wrong, and we cite a bunch of cases describing why that's wrong, and plaintiffs don't dispute that in their reply.

Now, they retreat to making a slightly different argument that, well, you might have to prove scienter for some claims, and -- well, actually, they say you have to prove scienter for all civil claims, I believe, or civil fraud and criminal.

That's also not true. There are government enforcement actions that can be brought. And I know Your Honor probably doesn't need to get into the nuance here, but there are government civil enforcement actions that can be brought for essentially negligent misstatements in SEC filings. And so scienter is not required across the
board either. It might be required for some sort of subspecies.

But if you look at the briefing as to what my partner said in closing argument, it is perfectly consistent with the law, and should, of course, be permitted to say the same in trial, too.

Now, Your Honor, briefly --
THE COURT: I think I locked up a couple of people for that myself. So I think I --

MR. HOFFMAN: Fair enough, Your Honor.

And I don't think the safe harbor provision was a valid defense.

THE COURT: It didn't protect them.
And I think -- I don't think I got reversed on this, but we'll see. I can't remember every reversal.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, there was a lot said about forward-looking statements and how those are unreliable, even though they appear in the SEC filings.

Your Honor, as my evidence professor in law school would say, that goes to the weight of the evidence, Your Honor, not its admissibility. Simple enough.

They can tell the jury to give those less weight because of the caveats and the uncertainty of the future, as they just explained, but that does not affect its admissibility, particularly in light of the foundation that
is laid. And they also, again, don't cite any authority for this distinction they're making between the numbers versus the forward-looking statements in the filing.

Finally, Your Honor, plaintiffs -- I'm not sure I totally follow the argument, but they seem to be making the argument that even though the chief financial officers of Fannie and Freddie signed these, and they signed these in the law -- to be clear, Your Honor, the law requires the signatories to sign them based on the officer's knowledge. That is a quote from the statute. And just for the Court's reference, it's 15 U.S. Code 7241.

So even without any testimony, Judge, there's ample evidence that the chief financial officers had knowledge of what was in those filings, because they signed them, and the law requires that the signature be based on the officer's knowledge. But even beyond that, Your Honor, there is specific testimony in this case that the chief financial officers were familiar with the contents.

The suggestion that the chief financial officer is not sufficient, the chief accountant who oversees -- the chief accountant at FHFA who oversees the process is not sufficient but that we need to go hunt around to find who at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac actually typed those words, I think is the suggestion, and cross-examine them about it, that there's no basis for that whatsoever, Your Honor.

These documents are incredibly reliable, the foundation is well laid, and they should be admitted into evidence. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GOODHART: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Frank Goodhart for the Class Plaintiffs.
I'll be presenting argument on plaintiffs' omnibus motion in limines numbers --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I can't quite hear you.
MR. GOODHART: I'll be presenting argument on plaintiffs' omnibus motions in limine Nos. 2 and 8, as well as responding to defendants' omnibus motion in limine No. 1, which we believe are kind of overlapping similar issues that make sense to address at the same time.

So through plaintiffs' motions in limine No. 2 and 8, plaintiffs are seeking to exclude the irrelevant deposition testimony of certain former GSE executives and FHFA employee: Ms. Naa Awaa Tagoe, Mr. Timothy Mayopoulos, and Mr. Ross Kari. And this deposition testimony concerns the executives' reactions to and opinions regarding the Third Amendment and its purpose.

Now, there's no dispute between the parties in this action that these executives did not participate in any discussions or take part in the process that led to the adoption of the Third Amendment. These witnesses all testified as much that they were not involved, and each of
them learned after the fact that -- learned of the Amendment after it had already been agreed to. And in the case of Ms. Tagoe, she learned after it had been announced.

So because they were not involved and have no personal knowledge of that process, for the reason, the motivation or purposes behind why the Third Amendment was agreed to, their testimony as to what its purpose is is in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 602's requirement that a plaintiff -- or that a witness has to have personal knowledge of something to testify to it, and any testimony as to their opinions of the net worth sweep and its effects are improper lay opinion testimony as well.

So what I'd like to do, Your Honor, is go through the testimony that we're talking about, and we'll start with Ms. Tagoe's testimony.

And I have some handouts that might be helpful to Your Honor as we go through this.

So this handles also Exhibit 2A to plaintiffs' omnibus brief.

So Ms. Tagoe was asked at her deposition at pages 252, lines 15, to 253, line 3: "What was your reaction when you heard about it?" "It" referring to the net worth sweep.

And she said: "You know, I don't remember my initial reaction. I will say that in the period leading up to that, we had been putting out these projections where we
were, you know, signaling that, in some scenarios, the enterprises, you know, that projected Treasury draws, you know, were in part because of that of the dividend, and so, you know, I could understand how the net worth sweep replacing that dividend rate would address that issue."

So, first, Your Honor, I'd point out that

Ms. Tagoe explicitly says she does not remember her reaction to the net worth sweep.

So defendants argue in their opposition that these officials have personal knowledge of their own reactions for purposes of Rule 602. But Ms. Tagoe says that she does not remember her reaction, so that's not true for her case.

And really, she's not giving her reaction in this testimony. What she's doing is she's giving a justification for it and speculating as to what the purpose of the Third Amendment was.

She said: "I could understand how the net worth sweep would address the issue of projected draws being the result of the 10 percent dividend in certain scenarios." So this testimony is not based on Ms. Tagoe's personal knowledge of what the net worth sweep was supposed to address because she has no personal knowledge because she was not involved in that decision. What she only offers is after-the-fact belief or inferences as to what it was meant to address.

And also, her opinion that the Third Amendment was meant to address this is improper opinion testimony and is not rationally based on any perception because she never perceived any discussion by those who made the decision concerning what they were trying to address.

Now, defendants' opposition, Your Honor, argues, well, Ms. Tagoe oversaw FHFA's GSE modeling division, so she had personal knowledge of FHFA's projections. And they say that, well, she's connecting the Third Amendment to those projections that she has knowledge of.

But, Your Honor, connecting is just a fancy word for speculating, because in her testimony, she's not really talking about her projections, she's explicitly claiming that she believes the Third Amendment was meant to address this issue and the projections that she perceived. So she has no knowledge of whether that's true or not.

And before I move on, there's one other point I want to raise with respect to Ms. Tagoe. And this is not referenced in our briefing on this particular motion in limine. But as Your Honor may be aware, the parties have separately submitted a joint submission on objections to deposition designations, and we've also separately identified identical sets of agreed-to deposition designations in our pretrial statements.

And in there, the parties acknowledge that certain
designations are still pending Your Honor's ruling on certain motions in limine. And the parties have reserved all rights to further object to those deposition designations depending on how Your Honor rules on these motions in limine.

So I guess I'm previewing that if Your Honor rules that Ms. Tagoe is allowed to offer this sort of testimony about her after-the-fact suppositions regarding what the purpose of the net worth sweep was to address, this is one of the designations that plaintiffs believe is separately objectionable under Rule 32. And that's because this is a stand-alone designation that comes well over 100 pages in the deposition transcript, after anything that plaintiffs have designated. And so it doesn't relate to anything we designated, so it's not proper to force plaintiffs to play it in their case.

But plaintiffs would separately object to defendants playing it in their case-in-chief, because Ms. Tagoe is a current FHFA employee and she's otherwise available for trial. So if Your Honor rules that Ms. Tagoe can offer this testimony and FHFA wants to offer it, they have to call her live to do so. So I just wanted to preview that Rule 32 objection because $I$ think it's relevant to the overall question of, if this testimony is admissible, how it can properly come in.

So next, Your Honor, I would like to talk about Mr. Mayopoulos, and $I$ have a separate handout for him as well.

So Mr. Mayopoulos was asked at his deposition, at page 146, lines 9 to 13: "Do you remember what your first reaction was when you heard about the Third Amendment?" And he says: "I don't remember what my reaction was."

His testimony then continues at page 147,3 to 5 of the transcript. He said: "I think I understood at least some of the issues that people were trying to address by the Amendment."

And then he further went on. Starting at pages 148, line 1 through 12, he says: "I think it was trying to preserve as much of the amount of the Treasury commitment under the PSPA as possible, and trying to reduce the possibility that future draws might -- especially future draws for dividend payments, might diminish the amount that was available under the PSPA enterprises. So that had been a discussion of some concern to people -- that was something that, if there was going to be an amendment to the PSPA, that was something that people were talking about trying to address."

So just like Ms. Tagoe, Mr. Mayopoulos is explicitly speculating as to what the reasons for approving the Third Amendment were. But, again, he has no personal,
firsthand knowledge of that because he was not involved. And he explicitly says what he thinks the Third Amendment was "trying to do," and he says he bases that belief on "what people were talking about trying to do." So he's speculating as to intent when he's not in the room, Your Honor, and he's basing that speculation on what some undefined people were talking about trying to do. So it's speculation based on hearsay ladened into this testimony, Your Honor.

Now, defendants' opposition claims, well,

Mr. Mayopoulos was the CEO of Fannie Mae. And he did big, important things like sign SEC filings and meet with FHFA officials on-site. But to be clear, none of those meetings were about the Third Amendment, Your Honor. And none of that changes that he was not involved in the conversation leading to the Third Amendment.

And just like Ms. Tagoe, Mr. Mayopoulos testifies verbatim: "I don't remember what my reaction was." So, again, defendants say he has personal knowledge of what his reaction was. That's not what he's saying.

THE COURT: I really don't like that kind of nit-picking of testimony.

He's the CEO, and because he says I don't remember my exact reaction, you're saying he can't testify about it? MR. GOODHART: Well, what I'm saying --

THE COURT: That's crazy.
MR. GOODHART: Well, what, respectfully, I'm
trying to --
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'll try to let you get through the argument, but that is -- it's really a preposterous argument to pick those words out of a CEO's testimony and say, because of that remark, I'm going to not let him testify about the whole subject.

MR. GOODHART: Well, it's not just that he didn't remember, it's that he wasn't involved in the decision, Your Honor.

THE COURT: He was involved. He's the CEO. How could he not be involved? He was involved.

MR. GOODHART: No, Mr. Mayopoulos testifies he was not involved in the decision to implement the Third Amendment. He didn't learn about it even until after the decision.

THE COURT: I understand.

But I guarantee you the CEO knew what was going on. He wasn't some bystander off the street the way you're making it sound.

MR. GOODHART: He was certainly not a bystander.
THE COURT: You know he knew what was going on.
I know he knew what was going on.
MR. GOODHART: Your Honor, we're not claiming he
was a bystander. I agree with Your Honor, he was no bystander. But he wasn't in the room is the point that we're trying to make.

THE COURT: That's a preposterous argument. I'll try to resist. Go ahead.

MR. GOODHART: I'd like to now move on to defendants' -- or Ms. McFarland's testimony that defendants are seeking to exclude in their omnibus motion in limine No. 1 .

So plaintiffs' position is that this testimony is substantively similar to the testimony of Ms. Tagoe, Mr. Mayopoulos, or Mr. Kari that $I$ just discussed.

And the point that plaintiffs are trying to make through their response to this motion is that all this testimony should be treated the same. So what I'd like to do is hand up -- hand out the testimony that this motion focuses on so Your Honor can see it.

So looking at page 44, starting at line 17, Your Honor, Ms. McFarland was similarly asked: "What was your reaction to the Third Amendment?" And she provided the following response -- which it starts at line [sic] 44, line 25, because the parties have agreed to cut some irrelevant testimony in the middle there.

She says: "I had shortly before that had a meeting with Treasury whereby we reviewed our forecasts, I
had expressed a view that $I$ believed we were now in sustainable profitability, that we would be able to deliver sustainable profits" --

THE COURT: Well, she had something for everybody at this trial. I mean, I don't know what --

MR. GOODHART: She knows a lot, Your Honor.
She says: "I even mentioned the possibility that it could get to a point in the not-so-distant future where the factors might exist whereby the allowance on the deferred tax asset would be released. We were not there yet, but, you know, you could see positive things occurring."

Now, that portion of her response, Your Honor, is not objected to. But she continues, and this following portion is what defendants are objecting to, but it's all part of one full response.

And she goes on: "So when the Amendment went into place, part of my reaction was they did that in response" --

THE COURT: What page are you on there?
MR. GOODHART: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear.
THE COURT: What page are you on?

MR. GOODHART: Oh, I'm sorry.
This is -- this should be cross-over from page 44 into 45.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOODHART: Do you see it?
45, starting line 11.

So she says: "When the Amendment went into place, part of my reaction was that they did that in response to my communication of our forecast and the implication of those forecasts; that it was probably desired not to allow capital to build up within the enterprises and not allow the enterprises to recapitalize themselves."

So defendants move to exclude this second portion of her response. And they make the same arguments to exclude this testimony that plaintiffs made in their motion in limine No. 2 and No. 8; that, one, Ms. McFarland doesn't have the personal knowledge of what the reasons for entering into the Third Amendment were because she was not involved; and, two, that the testimony is just speculation as to why it was adopted. So these are the same points that plaintiffs are trying to make with respect to the deposition testimony of Mr. Mayopoulos, Ms. Tagoe, and Mr. Kari.

And the same opposition arguments that defendants raise in their opp to defendants -- or plaintiffs' motion in limine apply equal to this testimony with respect to Ms. McFarland. She's the chief financial officer of Fannie Mae; she has intimate personal knowledge of Fannie Mae's financial condition, and that impacted her reaction to the Third Amendment.

And Ms. McFarland explicitly connects her reaction to her earlier meetings with Treasury and FHFA discussing Fannie Mae's financing -- finances. Thus, you know, her reaction could be said to be rationally based on her personal knowledge of that meeting.

And just as defendants argue that Ms. Tagoe's reaction was connected to her knowledge of FHFA's projections or Mr. Mayopoulos's reaction was based on his knowledge of finances of Fannie Mae, Ms. McFarland's reaction was based on her personal knowledge of that meeting.

So truthfully, plaintiffs believe that all of this testimony, where former executives of the GSEs and FHFA, in the form -- although Ms. Tagoe is still an employee -- it should all be treated the same.

So our view is that if Your Honor is inclined to allow the testimony of Ms. Tagoe --

THE COURT: The CEO. Then let her in too.

MR. GOODHART: Then it should all be treated as a piece, because it's similar of testimony of executives basing their thoughts on their knowledge basically.

THE COURT: She was an executive.
MR. GOODHART: She was the chief financial officer.

THE COURT: Hard to believe.

MR. GOODHART: So finally, Your Honor, I just want to quickly address two arguments that defendants have made in their opposition.

First, with respect to the testimony of Ms. Tagoe and Mr. Mayopoulos and Mr. Kari, defendants argue that, you know, plaintiffs put this testimony at issue in this case. Somehow, because at the first trial, plaintiffs criticize Mr. DeMarco for his failure to consult with GSE executives or FHFA executives prior to entering into the Amendment, we've put what they think about it at issue.

Now, I'll point out that, you know, apparently defendants only believe we put Ms. Tagoe, Mr. Mayopoulos, and Mr. Kari's opinions at issue, but we haven't put Ms. McFarland's testimony at issue.

But regardless, that misses the point, which is --

THE COURT: I got your point. I got it.

MR. GOODHART: -- the fact -- yeah. Understood, Your Honor.

And lastly, I just want to very quickly --
THE COURT: That one's a point worth making, because I remember her vividly.

MR. GOODHART: Quickly, defendants -- and I believe defendants understand our position here.

But just so Your Honor is aware, defendants make sort of a goose/gander argument on pages 15 to 17 of their
opposition, saying that plaintiffs are seeking to rely on this reaction-type testimony but preclude defendants from doing so, and that is absolutely not what we're trying to do.

The Benson and McFarland testimony that they cite on their pages 15 to 17 of their opp, we believe it should all by treated the same. So we designated as a reservation of rights, depending on how these MILs turned out. But either it's all in or it's all out is the way the plaintiffs see it. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thanks.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, Ian Hoffman once again on behalf defendants.

THE COURT: I know you like what I said about her, but how about the others?

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, Your Honor, I'd like to start with -- $I$ think you said just a moment ago, that is a point worth making. I'll start with that point, Your Honor, I'll start with Ms. McFarland.

And I'll start with counsel's argument that this is all -- if one kind of reaction testimony comes in, then it should all come in, because I think this is important to address.

The issue with Ms. McFarland is not her reaction testimony. The issue with Ms. McFarland's testimony here is
that, in the course of a long-winded answer, Judge, she strays directly into the kind of speculation that Your Honor ruled before the first trial is not admissible.

Your Honor threw out her deposition transcript. She speculated as to why she thought Treasury and FHFA would have gone into it, and you ruled before the first trial that that was impermissible. This is one series of lines snuck into a larger answer that does the exact same thing.

And, Your Honor, I just put up here on the ELMO the -- or whatever they're called these days -- the projector here, Judge -- and my own work product is there, Judge, but it says, "Not objected to" on the top, and "speculation" below.

The top portion, Your Honor, is Ms. McFarland's answer to the question: "What was your reaction to the Third Amendment?"

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOFFMAN: Her testimony is that: "My reaction was it" -- and I can turn it over, but generally it was: "It made me recall that $I$ had told them something."

And so she testifies what she claims she told FH -- I'm sorry, what she claims she told Treasury, and that's an important distinction.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. HOFFMAN: Now, you get to the next paragraph,

Judge, at line 11 of Ms. McFarland's testimony --
THE COURT: Right.
MR. HOFFMAN: -- she says, "So when it went into place, part of my reaction was that they did it in response to my communication of the forecasts. And it was probably a desire" -- again, a desire by Treasury and FHFA, or one or both -- "not to allow capital to build up within the enterprises and not allow them to recapitalize themselves."

That goes too far, Judge.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. HOFFMAN: We agree that all of these high-level executives' reactions to the Third Amendment can come in, and we can argue about their weight to the jury. And that is what is here on page 45 , lines 1 to 10 .

But page 45 , lines 11 to 16 , is something wholly different, Judge.

And just to remind Your Honor, this was the Court's ruling before the first trial:
"The testimony" -- and this is other testimony by Ms. McFarland saying almost exactly the same thing and almost exactly the same words. The Court ruled: "This testimony goes into detail why Ms. McFarland believed that Treasury would not want a buildup of capital in the GSEs." THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, I point back, line 15, -
buildup of capital -- I think Your Honor understands it. THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOFFMAN: It's the same thing that the Court has excluded.

That -- and all we're objecting to in our defendants' omnibus 1 is these lines 11 to 16 . The reaction testimony we are not objecting to.

And, Your Honor, I sense the Court's -- that it understands these issues, and I think our briefs well lay out our positions on this reaction testimony issue.

Ms. Tagoe, Mr. Mayopoulos, the CEO, and Mr. Kari, the CFO of Freddie Mac, extremely high-level individuals, not bystanders on the street, as Your Honor acknowledged.

Their testimony is not about the process that went into negotiating the Third Amendment. And their testimony, other than Ms. McFarland's piece right here, is not about what was going on in the minds of the decision-makers.

These same witnesses are the subject of plaintiffs' opening and closing arguments that go directly to Mr. DeMarco's process. They beat him up throughout trial. And they don't walk back that they're not going to beat him up throughout trial for, why didn't you consult people like Ms. Tagoe? And they will say that that is a reflection of the unreasonableness of FHFA's decision.

Now, when Ms. Tagoe is asked her reaction to the

Third Amendment, they want to block what her views on it are. That is highly probative to the very issue about: Was Mr. DeMarco's process sufficient or not?

The only response plaintiffs have in their reply brief is very superficial, Judge. And I was surprised when I read it, because all it says is, while Mr. DeMarco may have benefited from people like Ms. Tagoe's views, the jury will not benefit from hearing Ms. Tagoe's views about the Third Amendment. I'm paraphrasing a little bit, I don't have it in front of me, but look at their reply to see. And that is preposterous, Judge. That is precisely why the jury needs to hear her reaction to the Third Amendment.

Same for Mr. Mayopoulos, same for Mr. Kari, Your Honor. Each of them are testifying about what was in their own personal knowledge, and their testimony is highly relevant to the issues in the case.

Unless Your Honor has questions, I'll rest.
MR. GOODHART: Briefly, Your Honor.
So, Your Honor, I'd like to start where Mr. Hoffman just left off, which is the argument essentially that we put their views at issue because we criticize Mr. DeMarco for not seeking their input in entering into the decision.

And basically the argument that they're trying to
make is that, well, this is what they would have said had they been asked, and therefore that's why it's relevant.

But the fact is, is they were not asked. So the jury is not going to benefit by hearing about why somebody entered -- somebody else, DeMarco, entered into the Third Amendment by hearing a reason from somebody who was not asked. So they're basically trying to offer, well, this is what they would have said had they been asked, and it supports our defense in this case.

But, Your Honor, it's just not relevant to say, well, this is what they would have said under some different scenario. And a good case for Your Honor on that point is the Athride v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. case, which is cited at page 7,8 of plaintiffs' opening brief. It's 474 F. Supp. 2 d 102. It's a D.D.C. case from 2007, Your Honor.

Now, also, I heard Mr. Hoffman talking about Ms. McFarland's testimony is different here because she's not just talking about her reaction, she's talking about speculating why Treasury entered into the net worth sweep.

And to me it sounds like what they're trying to do is have their cake and eat it too here, because that's precisely what Mr. Mayopoulos is testifying to with the deposition testimony that we were seeking to preclude in our omnibus motion. He literally says what he thinks they were trying to do.

And as unbelievable as it may seem, Your Honor, the testimony of this case is that Mr. Mayopoulos, the CEO of Fannie Mae, and Don Layton, the CEO of Freddie Mac, they testified that they were not involved in the decision and found out after the decision had been made two days before announcement. So it's what Ms. McFarland is doing, it's no different from what Mr. Mayopoulos is doing. And what plaintiffs are seeking here is just consistency with how this evidence is treated.

There's an independent reason also why if Your Honor is inclined to admit the testimony of Mr. Mayopoulos, Ms. Tagoe and Mr. Kari, that Ms. McFarland should be treated the same way as well. And that's because her testimony, Your Honor -- or at least the portion that defendants are seeking to preclude -- is independently probative of a major factual dispute in this case, which is whether Ms. McFarland informed Treasury and FHFA prior to the Third Amendment that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were on a path of sustained profitability and could reverse -potentially reverse the evaluation allowance against the DTA in the not-so-distant future. Those are her words.

And the reason that the portion of the testimony that defendants are trying to preclude is independently probative of that incredibly important factual issue is that she says it was part of her reaction. The fact that she
learned about the net worth sweep and one of her first thoughts was, oh, part of my reaction was this is in response to what $I$ just told them. That's probative of the facts that she did, in fact, tell them before the net worth sweep was agreed to.

And, you know, essentially at trial, the first trial, defendants, through the testimony of Nicholas Satriano, an accountant at FHFA, they basically denied that that happened.

Mr. Satriano offered testimony that he disputed that anybody at FHFA was ever aware prior to the Third Amendment that -- and Fannie Mae had been considering a potential reversal of the DTA valuation allowance. That's what FHFA represented, Nicholas Satriano testified to. And this is evidence by Ms. McFarland that, no, I told them before that, and that was why it was part of her reaction. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll take ten minutes for the court reporter before he strangles me.

Is that fair?

COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. This Court stands in recess.
(Recess from 3:50 p.m. to 4:05 p.m.)
COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.

Please be seated, everyone, and come to order.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RUDY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's Lee Rudy for the plaintiffs.

Just to tell you where we are in our program, that plaintiffs have three more pieces of their affirmative motion that we will be arguing, me and two more, and then we'll be passing the podium to the defense.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUDY: I'll try to be brief in light of the hour.

I wish that we didn't spend as much time on the telephone during the last trial, Your Honor, debating the contours of the ruling of what was admissible and what was not, but this motion seeks to obviate some of those conferences.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. RUDY: So we think that the defendants'

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THE COURT: Right.
MR. RUDY: I'm presenting argument on our motion for clarification regarding the scope of the shareholder testimony, shareholder expectations testimony.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. RUDY: I want to just first say upfront, this is not a motion for reconsideration, this is a motion for clarification.
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objections, Your Honor, are inconsistent with Your Honor's ruling from the last trial, and we want to get things buttoned down as much as we can.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUDY: I have a brief -- a handout that sort of lays out the contested testimony that I'll hand up if that's okay.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RUDY: So if you see on the first page at the top -- $I$ can put it -- on the top, first you start on the top left with your order about what was --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RUDY: -- permissible.
And first I'll just note that, of course, that you did write that these were examples, this was not like the full contours of what was admissible.

But I'll just tell you that the pieces of evidence that are contested today all fall within the two examples of shareholders testifying that their dividend rights were taken away, and shareholders talking about why they brought this lawsuit.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. RUDY: That's all that we think that -- the four pieces of evidence I'm going to talk about all fairly fall within the contours of those two examples.

THE COURT: Of what I already ruled.

MR. RUDY: That's what you ruled -- that's what you ruled last time.

And then you have to the top right of this piece of paper, Mr. Stern's closing -- argument during his closing argument.

As you may recall, that after Mr. Stern closed, there was an objection that you ruled on that Mr. Stern had said, you didn't hear any of the shareholders say this, that, and the other. And we said, well, we weren't allowed to say this, that, and the other. And so Mr. Stern, in responding to that, gave the paragraph that I've cited up in the top right.

So he -- and it's nothing controversial. He's basically agreeing with Your Honor's motion in limine and what was admissible in that quoted paragraph.

So now if $I$ could just turn to the pieces of testimony that $I$ think are at issue.

The first is No. 1 on the first page here.

The first is No. 1, which is from Mr. Linekin. This was not objected to. So this is a piece of testimony that Mr. Linekin gave.

And I'll just quote. It says, you know: "I should say, what they said they were going to do was conserve and preserve the assets. And then they went in the
opposite direction. They took every dollar of cash flow, every dollar of profits from 2012 into perpetuity." So just to clarify, that testimony was not objected to.

But then if you look at No. 2 and No. 3, which are deposition snippets from Mr. Cacciapelle, one of the class representatives, who testified via deposition, we think that those -- which defendants do object to -- fall squarely within Your Honor's order, within what Mr. Stern said was permissible, and within the scope of what Mr. Linekin also testified about.

So I'll just -- you see No. 2. He's saying, you know, both No. 2 and No. 3, Mr. Cacciapelle is explaining why he brought the lawsuit. And he said he brought it because the net worth sweep took his dividends away.

Now, defendants are arguing that these passages are objectionable because they used the words "expected" and "surprised." And those words, they say, make this testimony impermissible about Mr. Cacciapelle's subjective expectations.

Now, our briefs point out that, of course, the questions that Mr. Cacciapelle is asked used those words. They ask him, well, what do you believe and why were you surprised?

But we don't think, in any event, that those magic words should prevent the jury from hearing Mr. Cacciapelle's
otherwise admissible testimony.
So we think that -- No. 2 and No. 3, we think, fall squarely within what Your Honor ruled was acceptable. It's about, he brought the lawsuit because he lost his dividends.

But just to be, you know, accommodating, I suppose, we've proposed these couple of redactions that would take out the words "expected" and "surprised" and take out this sort of flourish that he puts at the end, it sounded too totalitarian to me; took that out as well.

So what remains there of No. 2 and No. 3, we think is fairly -- is squarely within what Your Honor ruled last time and that their objection to it should be overruled.

Turning the page to No. 4. So this is Michelle Miller's testimony; she was another one of the class representatives.

And she testified she felt harmed because there were "no more dividends and the price had kind of remained stagnant."

And the defendants objected at trial. You may recall there was a lot of back and forth. We were on the phone for what felt like hours but it was probably just minutes.

But we were on the phone for a while debating this, Your Honor, because what defendants said is, "The lost
dividends theory is out of the case." So essentially Ms. Miller was not allowed to say that she felt harmed because she lost her dividends.

Again, we just went through Your Honor's opening ruling that losing your dividends is one of the key examples you give of what she can say.

And also pointing out that, you know, what Ms. Miller said is actually exactly what Your Honor ruled at summary judgment which is on the right column there. So your ruling on summary judgment about what our damages theory is, that's how Your Honor wrote our appropriate damages theory. You described it as -- you said the Third Amendment, by eliminating any possibility of future dividends for non-Treasury shareholders, deprived their shares of much of their value.

If you look back again at what Ms. Miller said, it tracks perfectly. She basically parroted Your Honor's motions for summary judgment ruling as to why she felt harmed. So we think that that's squarely admissible, Your Honor.

And then finally, turning the page, talking about -- oh, and I should say on that one, the defendants argue that you ruled on that and that that is a motion for reconsideration, and that's just wrong. We quoted to you the colloquy back and forth. What Your Honor ruled at the
time was that if $I$ wanted to persist in asking that question, you would give a curative instruction. And I said, Your Honor, I'll back away from it.

So I just wanted to -- I didn't want to have an argument with the Court in the middle of the trial -THE COURT: Right. MR. RUDY: -- so I just rephrased the question. But this next trial, $I$ do intend to ask her the same question. And I think that the answer she gave should be admitted because she's just saying, I lost my dividends and my stock price suffered, which I think are perfectly within everything that Your Honor has previously ruled.

The final passage, the third page, Ms. Miller testified, you see on the left side No. 5, there was no objection when $I$ asked her: "To be clear, are you here suing about anything that happened in 2008 , '9, '10 or '11?' And she said: "No." And that was not objected to.

Now, Mr. Cacciapelle wants to offer very similar testimony that the defendants do object to, which is on the right in passage No. 6. And that says basically, like -- so he was asked: "Did you have any objection to the conservatorship?" He said: "No, I could understand the government wanted something to keep people assured and quiet people down. I kind of understood that. And there would be some losses. I understood that. But it didn't seem to work
out that they should be losing forever."

So, you know, in summary, that's the way he put it. But basically he's saying, I have no objection to conservatorship. And then the last sentence, "but it didn't seem to work out they should be losing forever," is, again, a reference to losing his dividends which he's previously testified to. they're all squarely admissible under Your Honor's prior ruling, and we just wanted to clarify that they would be admissible for this next trial.

And the final point $I$ would just note is that Your Honor gave jury instructions, both at the end of the trial and before the class representatives testified, and those jury instructions made very clear that, you're going to hear from individuals who are going to tell you what they in their minds think. But I'm reminding you that what controls in this case is objective -- the objective expectations of shareholders, not subjective expectations. And jurors are presumed to follow that instruction, so there's really no prejudice to allowing them to give this testimony. So that's all I have, Your Honor.

MR. HOFFMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Ian Hoffman once again on behalf of the defendants.
Your Honor, in its prior ruling before the first

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So the four pieces of contested testimony, I think
    So the four pieces of contested testimony, I think
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they're all squarely admissible under Your Honor's prior
admissible for this next trial.
trial, the Court gave very clear direction and clear boundaries for shareholder testimony.

And, Your Honor, I'm just going to put on the projector what $I$ believe will look familiar to the Court.

This is the Court's opinion from August 21st, 2022, right before trial started. And the Court correctly recognized that the inquiry here is an objective one. And so the Court ruled: "It's hard to see how plaintiffs' subjective expectations could be relevant to that inquiry."

And then at the bottom of the page, Your Honor, there on the projector, you wrote here: "Any individual shareholder's subjective expectations are totally irrelevant to the objective inquiry of whether the net worth sweep violated a generic, reasonable shareholder's expectation," Your Honor. Each of the objected to portions of testimony, Your Honor, run headlong into the Court's ruling.

Your Honor, just to take one step back, and I think Your Honor knows this but I'll just state it again for the record to be clear, before the first trial, defendants objected to any shareholder testimony in light of the objective inquiry and the potential for confusion as to what these individuals would say and are they a representative sample and are their views peculiar or not peculiar and the like.

And, Your Honor, with all due respect, you know,
we lost that issue, at least in part, and we still maintain that there should be no shareholder testimony. But we respect the Court's ruling and we're not seeking to revisit that here.

Plaintiffs contend that they're just seeking clarification as to how this should apply so that we don't spend as much time on the phones in the second trial.

But, Your Honor, I would submit that we're not going to spend as much time on the phone on these issues in the second trial, Judge, because Your Honor's rulings on much of this same testimony should govern the second trial and don't need to be revisited so we don't need to go to the phones, Judge. And I'll tell you -- I'll point out in a moment specifically what those are.

But the Court's opinion here, October 21st, 2022, opinion, is clear what is in and what is out. And it is in substance -- and with all due respect to plaintiffs' counsel, this is, in substance, a reconsideration motion. Indeed, much of what Mr. Rudy just walked the Court through, the shareholders literally say the words, "I expected $X, Y$, and $Z . "$ And in their reply, perhaps begrudgingly recognizing that, Your Honor, they've proposed to strike the words "I expected," but otherwise leave the rest of the testimony, Your Honor. But that is superficial and it's window dressing and it doesn't solve the problem;
that this is subjective expectations testimony.
Your Honor, I'm not going to spend time focusing on deposition and trial testimony that we did not object to, because we have precious little time here.

But even just looking at the handout here from Mr. Rudy, the heading of No. 2 for Mr. Cacciapelle, he gives testimony that says: "I bought a security from someone who is receiving an 8 -plus percent dividend, and I expected -I was expecting the same treatment, getting the same thing"; in other words, I expected to get more dividends. And it appears the Amendment has pretty much taken that away. That is inadmissible. And striking the words "I expected" doesn't make it admissible.

Your Honor, the second piece of testimony is -- or at least the second one I'll address, Your Honor, forgive me if the numbering jumps around here, but is from Mrs. Miller. And this is one that Mr. Rudy pointed out. And I'll just try to keep it simple for everyone, I'll put it on the screen so we all know we're talking about the same thing.

So this is the Q\&A here, the underlined portion from the first trial. Mr. Rudy elicited from Ms. Miller: "And in what way do you feel like you were harmed?" Answer: "There were no more dividends and the price had kind of remained stagnant." And I quickly objected, Your Honor. And I don't believe the whole back and forth is on this
page, and I don't think Mr. Rudy was representing that it was.

But the outcome of this, Your Honor, was that you sustained my objection. You also granted my motion to strike this testimony from the record.

And I believe in plaintiffs' reply brief, there was a line about how there was no -- nothing stricken, just to keep the record totally clear and give you -- this is, perhaps, a little -- this, perhaps, is a little hard to read.

But, Your Honor, on this page of the deposition transcript, which I have somewhere, but I'll find the page number in a moment.

The Court directed -- the Court up top granted my motion to strike that very testimony that Mr. Rudy is asking the Court to allow this go-around, and you told the jury the last answer is going to be stricken.

And one of the reasons that Your Honor explained, and Mr. Rudy alluded to this, was that because it pertains to lost dividends and she thought she was harmed because she wasn't going to get any more dividends.

And I think the words that you cautioned Mr. Rudy with were that we're not going to get in a donnybrook over dividends. And if you want me to instruct the jury that lost dividends theory is out of the case, I can do so, and

I think that plaintiffs elected to pass.
So we're here again just going through the same arguments, Judge. And plaintiffs have said they're going to elicit the same question and answer that you struck and told the jury is stricken. There's no basis for that, Judge. These -- your court order was clear and the shareholders can give what testimony they can give within those parameters.

Again, each of -- and if you look back,
Your Honor -- and, again, we lay this all out in our papers, but many of the portions of deposition testimony that plaintiffs are seeking to introduce here also suffers from that same infirmity that Ms. Miller's testimony suffered from. She said: "Well, I didn't get dividends anymore."

And plaintiffs at trial, after striking that testimony and sustaining my objection, rephrased the question in a leading manner to say: "Do you believe you were harmed because the value of the shares went down?" And Ms. Miller said: "Yes."

Now, in the very same moment here, plaintiffs are seeking to introduce testimony from Mr. Cacciapelle, which is, in sum and substance, the same thing. I thought I was going to be getting dividends, and I stopped getting dividends.

And so just redlining the words "I was expecting" out of that doesn't solve the problem, A, because it's still
about his expectations, and, B, that claim is out of the case and it would merit the same kind of clarifying instruction to the jury that plaintiffs are not claiming and don't have a legal basis to lost dividends. And so I don't think that that testimony is in either.

There's a suggestion, an argument, I should say, Your Honor, that defendants opened the door to this somehow as to what my partner argued in closing for defendants and some of the statements he made in the colloquy with the judge.

And in terms of the first part of the colloquy with Your Honor, Mr. Stern merely repeated the categories that Your Honor had already identified as to what's in. He said: "Your Honor, I recognize that they can testify about $A, B$, and $C, "$ and $A, B$, and $C$ are literally lifted from your court order. And so there's not some major concession there, it's literally parroting back the words of the order.

But in terms of the statement that not a single one of those shareholders testified that the circular draws weren't a problem, we still think that's inbound, it's a fair summary of the evidence of what came in or not. But as we noted in a footnote in our brief, Your Honor, if Your Honor feels that that's out of bounds, we're willing to forego making that particular species of statement. Again,
it's just that: "No shareholder witness testified that circular draws were not a problem in the summer of 2012." We're willing to let that go if it will smooth this over; but, otherwise, all this testimony is out under the Court's prior opinion.

MR. RUDY: Your Honor, in light of the hour and I think this is well-briefed, I'll waive reply.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go to the next subject then.

MR. BARRY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael Barry for Class Plaintiffs.

I'm going to be addressing what is identified as MIL No. 5 in plaintiffs' omnibus motion.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BARRY: This motion contests plaintiffs counterdesignations of certain provisions of Ms. McFarland's testimony relating to three news articles that are written in the Wall Street Journal, Reuters, and The Washington Post after -- from August 8th and 9th, 2012.

Now, in the prior proceeding, this Court did overrule our objection to the admission of these designations as hearsay, and I'll address those in a moment, but the Court did not address the relevancy of these designations.

So, first, those designations should be excluded
as irrelevant under Rule 401. The testimony and the underlying articles that are cited as exhibits should be inadmissible as double hearsay under Rule 801, 802, and 805. And finally, they're unduly prejudicial because the jury is likely to consider them for the truth, even to the extent that defendants are disavowing that.

First, let's start with the relevancy.
Ms. McFarland's testimony regarding the articles and the underlying articles themselves and having them read to her in the form of questions is irrelevant. A, it's not relevant to investor expectations and the defendants don't claim otherwise.

Under the law of the case, the date of contracting, for the purposes of the implied covenant claim, is December 24th, 2009. So whatever quotes and articles were published in August $8 t h$ and 9th, 2012, is simply irrelevant to investors' expectations.

So what's it relevant to?
It's also not relevant to whether Mr. DeMarco's decision to implement the Third Amendment was arbitrary and reasonable.

Mr. DeMarco did not read the news articles when he made the decision to enter into the net worth sweep of the Third Amendment.

Mr. DeMarco testified that he relied on what the
companies put in their filings and other analysts and analyst reports, and only specifically remembered one from Moody's.

Nowhere did Mr. DeMarco testify that he read the articles. Nowhere did Mr. DeMarco testify that he relied on the opinion of Ms. McFarland regarding Fannie Mae's financial condition or its ability to fund the dividend.

Because Mr. DeMarco did not testify that he relied on the articles, they are not relevant to his decision to enter into the Third Amendment.

Now, defendants argue, as far as relevance goes, that "Her statements concerning Fannie Mae's ability to meet the dividend -- its dividend obligation on the eve of the Third Amendment when she was CEO -- CFO are relevant to the center issue in this case: Whether FHFA acted reasonably in agreeing to the Third Amendment, given the possibility that Fannie Mae could not meet its dividend obligations without additional circular draws on the Treasury commitment."

And they highlight that by saying Ms. McFarland testified that, as Fannie Mae's CFO, she had access to specialized nonpublic information about the company, including the best projections of anyone who was trying to forecast Fannie's future profitability.

Well, first, none of her opinion testimony or the articles underlying that testimony are relevant to

Mr. McFar -- Mr. DeMarco's decision to enter into the net worth sweep. Her opinions are only relevant to the extent they were --

THE COURT: I thought they were trying to impeach her, weren't they?

MR. BARRY: Pardon me?

THE COURT: I thought they were impeaching her.
MR. BARRY: No, they're not impeaching her at all.

As a matter of fact, we'll get to those in a minute because --

THE COURT: Well, I thought that's what they were doing, though.

MR. BARRY: No, they're not -- as a matter of fact, let me hand up the testimony.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BARRY: I'm going to hand you what's been previously provided to defendants as Exhibit 5B, as in boy, to our opening MIL.

THE COURT: This is her testimony?
MR. BARRY: This is her testimony.
And we'll get to the testimony.
But first off, let me explain.
THE COURT: My recollection may be faulty. I just remember her being coy.

MR. BARRY: And that's fine. And we'll get to
that in a minute.

THE COURT: I shouldn't have said that, should I?
MR. BARRY: The first point $I$ want to make is the relevance -- her opinions as to the expectation of Fannie to meet the dividend obligation without -- is only relevant if it was communicated to Mr. DeMarco, and it wasn't.

THE COURT: Oh, it's relevant because it's communicated to the jury.

MR. BARRY: Pardon me?

THE COURT: It was communicated to the jury.
MR. BARRY: It was communicated to the jury but --
THE COURT: So it's relevant because she's sitting here telling the jury they're in great shape and they're going to have this back in no time. That's what she's telling the jury.

MR. BARRY: She did tell the jury.

And then the --

THE COURT: I didn't believe her for a minute.

MR. BARRY: And in the articles, she's asked to confirm whether or not she said certain statements in interviews with the Wall Street Journal, the New York -- the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and Reuters.

But significantly and more significantly, defendants have proffered no justification because it has nothing to do with what the FHFA did. The only reason they
want to introduce this is because who said it: Ms. McFarland.

THE COURT: Yeah, because she said that to the jury.

MR. BARRY: Because --

THE COURT: That's why they want to use it.
MR. BARRY: They want to use it because she has a specialized knowledge. She knows more than anybody else.

THE COURT: That's what she said. Yeah, she knows more than anybody.

MR. BARRY: And that conceded that they want to introduce it for the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: No, they want to impeach her. That's a valid use, isn't it?

MR. BARRY: They want to impeach her for what? She didn't say she disputed -- let's look at the articles; let's look at the testimony, please.

First off, the news articles are clearly hearsay, there's no question about that. News articles are hearsay, Hutira versus Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F.Supp.2d 115; Atkins versus Fischer, 232 F.R.D. 116.

Defendants don't argue that the articles themselves constitute hearsay. Their sole justification is that they're supposedly not being introduced for their truth.

Now, the three designations at issue are passages where the questioner simply read portions of articles to Ms. McFarland that purported to quote her and then asked if those statements were true at the time she purportedly made those statements.

First, even if the introduction of testimony of reading the articles themselves falls within somehow that it doesn't constitute hearsay, reading the quotes within the articles is secondary hearsay, they'd have to come up with a subsequent justification for doing that, and the defendants have offered no such justification.

In the Wall Street Journal article, which starts on 198, 11 to 17, the questioner just jumps in and reads the quote and asks Ms. McFarland if that quote was correct when she allegedly made it. There was no effort to refresh her recollection, she did not deny making it, nor did she deny speaking with the press. So there was no basis for introducing that underlying quote from the article.

The same goes for Reuters. The Reuters passage starts on page 201 to 220 -- -13, and continues through 202 to 13.

In the first part of that passage, the questioner just starts reading from portions of the article that paraphrase what Ms. McFarland allegedly said; they don't purport to be quoting her.

But then the questioner does get around to the quote, and, again, just reads the quote, and asks Ms. McFarland if that was true when made. Again, no effort to lay a foundation as to where the quote came from in the article or whether it was necessary and appropriate to impeach her on it.

Third, the passage from The Washington Post, which begins on page 203, 23, and continues through 205, at least the questioner there does ask if Ms. McFarland remembers speaking with The Post, and she says she doesn't remember.

But then she doesn't -- he doesn't refresh her recollection with the item. She simply says: "I don't know if you got it from a press report, but I don't remember speaking with anyone there."

The only reason they're trying to introduce these quotes is to try to prove that, as of August 7th and 8th of 2012, Ms. McFarland, in fact, believed that the statements attributed to her in those articles were true. That's why the questioner entered every examination regarding the document with: "Did you believe it was true when you said it?"

In the prior proceeding now, this Court did overrule the objection, but we believe on an improper basis. This Court said: "Defendants are not offering those for the truth of the matter in the articles. They're offering it to
facilitate her testimony at the deposition regarding those were her beliefs at the time, and, therefore, it's not hearsay."

Defendants make the same argument again here. They argue: "Likewise, the articles themselves are not being offered for any purpose other than to establish the statements were made and published by the respective media outlet."

First, the fact that the statements were made and published by the media outlets have no bearing on Mr. DeMarco's decision to enter into the net worth sweep because she wasn't consulted and she didn't know about it.

Second, if the articles themselves are not being offered for any purpose other than to establish that they were made, why is it relevant that those statements were made? Ms. McFarland never denied making those statements.

From the defendant's perspective, the fact that the statements were made is not what's important, it's who made them. She was Fannie Mae's CFO at the time and they're arguing that she has to be -- that her testimony -- that her testimony that -- the quote that was quoted in the article should be believed because she was the CFO and she had specialized knowledge. That's introducing it for the truth of the matter asserted, not for impeachment purposes. There's no relevance as to -- no independent relevance as to
the timing of the statement or the fact that it was made.

Finally, to the extent that they're trying to say that they're going to -- I'm going to impeach it because it's an adoptive admission, you can't do that with your own party witness. The Rules of Evidence, Rule $801(d)(2)(D)$, only applies to admissions of an opposing party. Ms. McFarland is not an opposing party of the FHFA and the defendants here. So as a result to the extent they want to introduce such testimony as an adoptive admission, that's not appropriate either.

Finally, to the extent that the Court -- it's otherwise somehow potentially admissible, the writ -because they've articulated a non-hearsay purpose, it is very likely, almost impossibly unlikely, that the jury will listen to it for any reason other than the truth of the matter asserted, which is her statements to Reuters and the Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post supposedly at the time about whether or not Fannie Mae had the ability to fund its dividends without further drawing down the Treasury commitment.

Her testimony that they're relying on to say that she was the CFO, the only reason they're introducing it is for the truth. And to the extent that they're arguing, well, it's just opining, the jury is going to hear it and will believe it -- will mistakenly believe it for the truth
of the matter asserted.

So whatever it's -- there's significant unfair prejudice, that the risk of it being improperly taken by the jury outweighs whatever probative value there would be by introducing it for the defendants.

Unless the Court has any questions --

THE COURT: No.

MR. HOFFMAN: Ian Hoffman once again, Your Honor, for the defendants.

I will try to keep this brief, both because I'm -I don't want to hog all the fun for my colleagues but also we're also running late in the day.

I'm also going to be brief on this one,

Your Honor, because, as plaintiffs just acknowledged, this issue came up in the first trial, you ruled on it. You ruled that her testimony and the associated documents are not barred by hearsay because her -- what is coming in is her testimony. The questions are: "Did you say this at the time?" -- I'll then read the article. Question: "Did you say this at the time?" "Yes." "Was it true at the time?" "Yes."

The statements are coming in for the non- -- the statements that are being read are coming in for the non-hearsay purpose. And her testimony where she says "yes" is coming in for the truth because it's as if she's sitting
on the stand, Your Honor, even though it was from a deposition transcript.

The Court's ruling was exactly right. This is the Court's words: "Defendants are not offering those for the truth of the matter asserted in the articles, they're offering it to facilitate her testimony at the deposition, that those were her beliefs at the time. It's not hearsay, therefore."

That was exactly right, Judge. It was right then and it's right now. I think that plaintiffs are saying this was essentially clear error and they don't identify any error as such.

As for relevance, Your Honor, I think you hit the nail on the head. First, it's independently relevant for all the reasons we have laid out in our papers. This is all about the financial condition of Fannie Mae in the summer of 2012. It's also relevant for impeachment.

As Your Honor correctly noted, Ms. McFarland took the stand, and I believe Your Honor's words were, she told the jury that Fannie is in great shape, in great shape, and so she was -- they were in such great shape, she was surprised by the Third Amendment, and she thought, it must mean that Treasury wanted to take all this extra money away from them, which the implication is it was beyond the 10 percent dividend.

And so the opposing counsel at the time of her deposition confronted her with all of these contemporaneous statements that she made back in August of 2012 , saying, they're not in great shape and they don't expect to earn enough money in excess of the 10 percent dividend, which, by implication and even expressly as the SEC filings show that she signed, means circular draws would continue. That that testimony is irrelevant in this case is implausible, I'll keep it at that.

In light of the time, Your Honor, I will rest the remainder of our arguments on our briefs. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Any other issues?

MR. RUDY: Your Honor, in the interest of time, we'll waive rebuttal.

MR. HUME: Hamish Hume for the Class Plaintiffs. Judge Lamberth, we have one more motion; however -- and that I'm going to argue, and it is important to us, it's about five exhibits; however, it is not that important to have it resolved sooner rather than later.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUME: Whereas the defendants have a series of MILs that we're optimistic are going to be denied but that are very important to have resolved well in advance -- as much in advance of the opening as possible.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUME: So partly to be gracious and partly out of selfish reasons, as long as I can get a chance to argue this motion maybe Monday or Tuesday at a gap, we could wait on that and see if we could get to defendants.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. HUME: Thank you.
MR. STERN: Your Honor, that's fine.

We can at least get -- I'm sorry.

Jonathan Stern for the defendants, if I may, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STERN: That proposal is fine, Your Honor. Let's see how far we get skipping the motion to which Mr. Hume referred. If somehow we speed through them in time for the Court to take argument on everything, that's fine; otherwise, we are fine with deferring if that pleases the Court.

THE COURT: That's fine.
Let's start with the first defense motion you'll want to get done.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. Stanton Jones for the defendants.

The first motion that we'd like to take up today is our motion to revise jury instructions.

And I first have a report on our request to revise
the trial one jury instruction regarding Virginia prejudgment interest.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JONES: We had requested a change to this based on settled Virginia law.

Within the last 24 hours, the parties have -- are discussing a possible agreement to resolve that request that we made, that aspect of our motion on the jury instructions. And I believe it's fair to say that we're at least reasonably close to reaching an agreement that would resolve that one.

So if it's acceptable to Your Honor, we would propose to have Your Honor withhold a decision on the Virginia pre judgment interest issue --

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. JONES: -- and allow the parties -- we'll report back if we need court intervention on it.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JONES: I did want to take up today our request to revise the trial one jury instructions regarding the explanation of an unreasonable action in the context of whether FHFA's decision to enter into the Third Amendment was arbitrary or unreasonable, and I'd like to make three points about the instruction explaining an unreasonable action.

First, as Your Honor will recall at the first trial, the jury --

THE COURT: What motion number is that?

MR. JONES: Sorry. This is ECF 303. It's defendants' omnibus motion to revise jury instructions.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JONES: And the memo of law is in the same ECF filing behind the cover motion.

And this is Roman numeral I, starting on page 1, defendants' motion to revise jury instructions No. 1, explaining an unreasonable action.

THE COURT: Okay. 303. Okay.
MR. JONES: Okay.

So as Your Honor will recall, at the first trial, the jury sent out a note during its deliberations, and the note expressed confusion about the jury instruction that attempted to explain "an unreasonable action." The jury's note requested, "more plain language, layman's terms, and less legalese."

And this was an aspect of the instructions that the plaintiffs had proposed, the defendants had proposed a different version, Your Honor adopted the plaintiffs' version.

And when we looked back at it, we believe that the jury's expression of confusion was reasonable, was fair.

There are aspects of the instruction -- of the prior instruction's explanation of an unreasonable action that, I think, are unclear, potentially confusing, and that don't adequately explain the connection between the reasonableness of FHFA's decision and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders. So that's the first point. There was confusion. That was fair.

The second point is that defendants, in response to that jury note, at least in part in response to that jury note, have proposed a modest set of changes to this instruction that are designed to add clarity.

Plaintiffs, for their part, have opposed any change at all and want to give the same instruction that jurors apparently struggled with at the first trial. Defendants, by contrast, have proposed a modest set of changes. That's the second point.

The third point is that we have, I think, four proposed changes and they're all consistent with this Court's prior rulings in the case, as well as other relevant case law, and they do -- these changes that we have proposed will give the jury more and better guidance to help them understand this really central inquiry in the case: Whether FHFA's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable.

So the first change that we proposed was to strike some language that we think was confusing. There were
references to what's expected and to some unspecified notion of fairness. We've proposed to strike those. They make the instruction longer and harder to understand.

Second, we've proposed adding just a couple of basic clarifying points in layman's terms, trying to avoid legalese. One of those is that there can be multiple options or choices that are reasonable under the facts and circumstances. And that's consistent with extensive case law that we've cited in multiple legal contexts, making the point that, in evaluating the reasonableness of a particular action or decision doesn't necessarily have to be the best option or just one option, there can be multiple options that are reasonable. It's a basic point that a layperson could use to help understand the inquiry.

THE COURT: I think that's true. That's one of the problems with this going to a jury rather than a court is a court understands the distinction of "reasonable" versus "ideal." And it's harder, in this kind of a concept, to get that concept across, that "reasonable" means there could be various things that would be reasonable. So

I don't disagree that that may be one of the problems the first jury had.

MR. JONES: Exactly.
And the specific language we have proposed to add to try our best to get that point to the jury is, "There can
be multiple, reasonable options in a given set of facts and circumstances."

THE COURT: See, I think that's hard -- a hard concept for a jury to deal with. They think that things should be black or white, because normally at a criminal case, they are, we tell them it's black or white.

MR. JONES: Sure. Totally understand and agree. As I say, this was our best effort to convey the point in an understandable way, whereas the prior jury instructions don't include this concept at all, so this is an addition by us that we think is warranted.

The second straightforward point that we want to add is at the end of that paragraph in the instructions. And it's to convey the notion that in evaluating the reasonableness of the decision or action, the jury can consider the decision-maker's objectives.

If the jury's task is to decide whether there was an appropriate justification for the decision or action, the jury can consider, well, what was the decision-maker trying to achieve and does that constitute an adequate or appropriate justification for the decision or action that was made?

Again, it's a point that we have tried to convey in as clear, straightforward, non-legalese language here that we can. It's a point that was completely missing from
the trial one jury instructions, and we think would help address the confusion that was expressed previously.

The third change that we've added is slightly different in kind. There's a paragraph in this portion of the instructions that just characterizes the plaintiffs' position on unreasonableness. It begins: "In this case, plaintiffs allege that FHFA," and it goes on to say "acted unreasonably."

In the prior jury instructions, there was no statement there of the defendants' position, so we've just added a short paragraph, it's one sentence, that simply states defendants' position about the reasonableness of the action to go right after plaintiffs' statement of the unreasonableness.

And then the last change that we've made, it appears in a few places, but it's the same point in each place, which is, just to be very specific in telling the jury that the reasonable expectations of shareholders under the shareholder contract are measured as of December 24 th, 2009, which was the date of the Second Amendment to the PSPAs. And that's what Your Honor ruled was the relevant "time of contracting" for purposes of measuring shareholders' reasonable expectations under their contract. We just put that date in to make it explicit that that's the jury's task.

So those are the four changes that we had proposed to try to improve this instruction over what was presented to the jury last time. We think that both individually and together as a whole, these changes help eliminate the confusion that the jury expressed last time and also help explain more clearly the connection between the reasonableness of $F H F A ' s$ action and the reasonable expectations of shareholders at the time of contracting.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JONES: So that is all the argument $I$ have for the motion on the jury instructions, so $I$ will allow the other side to --

THE COURT: On 303. All right.
MR. JONES: Yep.

MR. KRAVETZ: Good afternoon again, Your Honor. Robert Kravetz on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs.

As Mr. Jones indicated, we are confident that we'll reach an agreement as to pre judgment interest.

I would say despite the number of motions today, we've had an extremely collaborative and professional relationship with defendants, which is really refreshing for a case of this magnitude.

I'll touch briefly on nominal damages.

Defendants didn't mention it, we'll rest on our papers at this time, Your Honor. We think that that
instruction is dependent on the evidence and argument that will come in at trial.

We've previewed why we think that that instruction will not be appropriate, so we don't think it's ripe for a decision at this time but that Your Honor could defer until we get further in the trial.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KRAVETZ: In terms of the reasonableness instruction, we do not see a basis to modify the instruction regarding the implied covenant, which we believe to be consistent with applicable law.

I would start with the decision-maker's objectives.

The defense requests to introduce an instruction that the jury may "consider the decision-maker's objectives and obligations."

Here we think the defendants misunderstand our position a bit, Your Honor. It's not that the existing facts and circumstances at the time of the decision are irrelevant, which is not what we argued, the net worth sweep occurred in August of 2012 , so, of course, the jury will and must consider that conduct.

But the defendants' proposed language simply does not flesh out the concept of evaluating facts and circumstances as they claim; rather, the language posed by
the defendant disregards [sic] that reasonableness must be assessed as against shareholder expectations, not solely against defendants' objectives or obligations, and is thus directly contrary to Delaware law and the law of the case.

And we cite in our papers, Your Honor, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Gerber. And defendants really -- we view the changes that defendants are suggesting with respect to the instructions is much closer to a tort-based standard. A tort-based standard is going to focus on what happened at the time of the wrong.

But as the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear, "an implied covenant claimed by contrast looks to the past, it is not a free-floating duty unattached to the underlying legal documents. It does not ask what duty the law should impose on the parties given the relationship at the time of the wrong, but, rather, what the parties would have agreed to themselves had they considered the issue in their original bargaining positions at the time of contracting."

And the Delaware Court in Gerber also touched on the concept of fair dealing in light of the counterparties' expectations, stating that the commitment to act fairly under the implied covenant must be consistent with the terms of the parties' agreement and purpose, and, once again, said that the same retrospective focus applies equally to the exercise of discretionary rights; that is, what is arbitrary
or unreasonable or conversely reasonable depends on the parties' original contractual expectations, not the free-floating duty that I mentioned earlier.

THE COURT: That's a Delaware Chancery Court or what?

MR. KRAVETZ: That's Delaware Supreme Court, Your Honor. It's Gerber versus Enterprise Holdings, LLC. And the cite is 67 A.3d 400. And the pincite would be 418 to 419.

We believe that the defendants' formulation of generalized objection -- objectives, obligations, and circumstances ignores that the claims at issue require a retrospective analysis with a reasonableness of the conduct at the time of the breach is measured as against expectations.

In terms of the second request that I'll cover, Your Honor, we also do not see a basis to instruct the jury that there "can be multiple, reasonable alternatives in a given set of facts or circumstances."

First, the question here, Your Honor, is whether the conduct actually taken by the defendants frustrated the benefit of the bargain and breached the implied covenant. What matters is whether the chosen option violated the counterparties' reasonable expectations.

And it's not necessarily true in this specific
context in this specific claim that there can be multiple reasonable options in the implied covenant setting. Often it's a binary choice whether a party acted in accordance with contractual expectations or they breached.

And it's notable that the cases that the defendants cited in their brief were cases that occurred outside of the implied covenant context, where, in a tort context, you may be able to get the instruction that there could be multiple reasonable alternatives.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KRAVETZ: And certainly here, defendants have not pointed factually to the existence of any options that Mr. DeMarco considered that may have addressed the circular draw problem without violating shareholder expectations.

Second, at the last trial, plaintiffs pointed to the existence of additional alternatives in a different context.

We argue that if preserving --

THE COURT: That's why I said the government doesn't act this way on their own.

MR. KRAVETZ: Yes.

THE COURT: It still boggles me.

MR. KRAVETZ: And we argue that if preserving the Treasury commitment was what the defendants really cared about, there were ways to address it without violating
shareholder expectations, and so that evidence and argument --

THE COURT: Oh, I don't know about that.

MR. HUME: -- went to defendants' intent and motive, and was not to address any circular draw issues but, instead, to wind down Fannie and Freddie.

So referencing alternatives in that context does not change the relevant inquiry. In fact, it underscores that the test is whether the defendants' specific conduct violated shareholder expectations which is captured by the existing instructions consistent with the law.

Next, Your Honor, defendants are requesting to delete the clause "beyond what can be expected or beyond the limits of fairness."

We walked through very specific examples in our papers as to why that language is amply supported under the applicable case law, and I won't re-tread that here.

But it's also clear that when Your Honor provided that example from the next sentence in the instruction, that the Court's explanation of what made the arbitrary or unreasonable conduct, most of the formulation of which defendants do not challenge, must be assessed in light of the parties' objectively reasonable expectations under the contract.

THE COURT: Well, that's what we're applying is
contract law.

MR. KRAVETZ: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that's what the Delaware case would be talking about.

MR. KRAVETZ: That's correct, Your Honor.
And, finally, in terms of including defendants' response, you know, in all jury trials, the Court provides a summary of the claim or the summary of the crime at issue. That's because that's a specific question that the jury must decide.

The Court did so here with a neutral description of the claim. We don't see any supporting case law or model instruction that there should be a response to that.

There's no affirmative defense here for the jury to decide. And we do think that the instruction simply includes argument that is captured by other instructions that the defendants should make to the jury.

So for those reasons, we think that the Court's original instructions were correct, consistent with applicable law, and should not be modified for the re-trial. Thank you.

THE COURT: Can you believe the defendants agree with me on something -- I mean, the plaintiffs? I know the defendants would.

Okay. What's the next one?

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.
Could I just make one point on this one before we move? I have the next one too, so I'll be staying up here.

Just quickly on the instructions issue.
On the Gerber case from the Delaware Supreme Court, 2013 --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JONES: -- it says that the inquiry looks to the past to determine the parties' expectations at the time of contracting.

THE COURT: Parties.

MR. JONES: The parties, both parties, plural, not possessive.

That's looking back to December 24th, 2009.
But the ultimate inquiry for the jury under Delaware law is still whether FHFA, the decision-maker, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JONES: -- in August 2012, which is when they made the decision.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JONES: Now, these are, Your Honor, as I think Your Honor alluded, these are complicated concepts, connecting whether FHFA acted arbitrarily or unreasonably based on the existing facts and circumstances in August 2012
and thereby violated the parties' reasonable expectations in December 2009. Our changes to the jury instructions on reasonableness are designed to help the jury understand that connection. And I think that they do a better job of explaining that connection than the trial one jury instructions which the jurors --

THE COURT: Which the jury had some trouble with, I agree.

MR. JONES: They had some trouble with.

And, again, and the plaintiffs, for their part, have proposed no changes. If they have their way, then we will just give the jury the same problematic instruction, whereas $I$ think our instructions improve on the prior instruction and are completely consistent with the Gerber case and all other relevant case law. So that's all on the jury instructions issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: The next motion that defendants would like to present is our motion to revisit the Court's evidentiary ruling admitting the Stegman memo. This is PX205. The ECF number of this motion, if you want to just get there, Your Honor, is -- it's ECF 291 on, I believe, the Class docket.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. JONES: So I think we have taken plaintiffs to
task a couple of times today for re-treading old ground. I will admit that we are going back to the well on this one. The Stegman memo, PX205, which plaintiffs have said is the most important document in this lawsuit, should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay.

THE COURT: Which number?

MR. JONES: So the ECF filing of our motion here is ECF 291 on the Class docket.

THE COURT: Right.
But what's the most important document?

MR. JONES: PX, Plaintiff's Exhibit 205.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JONES: It's been referred to as the Stegman memo.

And Your Honor heard extensive argument about it previously.

I can put a copy of the Stegman memo on the ELMO just so we know exactly what we're taking about.

So the Stegman memo, PX205, is a document that the parties disputed its admissibility --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JONES: -- before and during the last trial. The Court previously found that this Stegman memo is a public record. And while the defendants respectfully disagree with that ruling and preserve their objection on
that issue for appeal.
Even as a public record, Your Honor, this memo is still inadmissible because it contains embedded hearsay to which no exception applies. And we believe that that issue of the admissibility of the embedded hearsay was not directly addressed the last time.

And there are two key points that are now undisputed.

First, the Stegman memo, it is undisputed, contains two layers of hearsay. The first layer is Mr. Stegman authoring this memo out of court. So the memo itself, the writing of the memo by Mr. Stegman, is the first layer of hearsay. That is what Your Honor ruled was a public record.

The second layer of hearsay, however, is then-Secretary Geithner's out-of-court oral statements to Mr. Stegman describing Secretary Geithner's meeting of a day earlier with Mr. DeMarco.

And you can see in the first sentence of the memo, Mr. Stegman writes, "The Secretary provided an overview of his," meaning Ms. Miller's, "and your previous" -I'm sorry, his and your, meaning the Secretary's and Ms. Miller's, "previous day's meeting with Ed DeMarco. This is the essence of the discussion that took place."

So on its face, this document, start to finish, is

Mr. Stegman writing the memo out of court, that's the first layer of hearsay. But then the entire memo is just Mr. Stegman relating what Secretary Geithner told Mr. Stegman about the meeting with DeMarco. And so that's the second layer of hearsay. So it's undisputed that there are two layers of hearsay.

The second key point that's now undisputed, different from the first trial, is that this memo is inadmissible unless both of those layers of hearsay are subject to some exception or exemption.

Plaintiffs previously argued at the first trial, in fact, it was their only argument for admission of this document, that the public-records exception under 803(8) is a multilayer hearsay exception, meaning, at least in their argument, that because it's a public record, it doesn't matter how many layers of hearsay it is. Public record -their view of the law, based on a Seventh Circuit case called Amoco Cadiz, was that all -- any and all layers of hearsay in a public record come in because it's a public record, okay?

We argued in our motion and explained that that's just an incorrect statement of the law. It's not the law in the Seventh Circuit, it's contrary to decisions of the D.C. Circuit and other courts in this district and around the country.

In their response brief, plaintiffs abandoned the argument that they made, which, again, was their only argument for admissibility of the embedded hearsay at the first trial.

They have abandoned the multilayer hearsay already. They don't even cite the Amoco Cadiz case. And they do not refute our argument in our opening motion that that prior argument they made was just an incorrect statement of the law.

So it is now undisputed that this memo is inadmissible, it is out unless the embedded hearsay from Secretary Geithner here is covered by some hearsay exception. And plaintiffs have failed to establish any exception for the embedded hearsay. They invoke -- they invoke the public-records exception and the Residual Exception, but neither one applies and we think the briefing makes that very clear.

On public records, it is not entirely clear to us from plaintiffs' brief what they are arguing about public records. But in any event, they don't establish that the exception applies to the embedded hearsay.

They don't identify a single case indicating that Rule 805, which says that each layer of hearsay needs an exception, they don't cite a single case indicating that 805 does not apply when the embedded hearsay in a public record
is from another agency official, which appears to be at least part of what they're arguing. There's no case law that supports that view. And the cases that we cited, our motion actually refute that view, and we explain that in our reply brief.

And the plaintiffs' assertion that Secretary Geithner's embedded hearsay in this memo is itself a public record is both conclusory, it's set forth in a single sentence in their motion without elaboration, and it's just incorrect. There's no basis to conclude that whatever Secretary Geithner told Mr. Stegman, apparently in some oral conversation that they had, is a public record within the meaning of Rule 803(8).

The Residual Exception does not apply here either. The case law, as Your Honor is well-aware, establishes that the Residual Exception is extremely narrow and rarely applies. It has been applied to things like SEC filings, where the authors and signatories, there are very serious consequences for misstatements; there are extraordinary bases for reliability and importance.

But this is just an internal memo between two Treasury officials, where one of them is describing a conversation he had with the Secretary. It doesn't come close to having sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. And in any event, even if it did, there are more -- this
document is not more probative than any other evidence plaintiffs could try to admit.

They want to admit this document because of what Secretary Geithner reportedly or supposedly told Mr. Stegman that Mr. Stegman is writing here about what Mr. DeMarco said at a meeting. But Mr. DeMarco, of course, is testifying live. The plaintiffs can just ask him about what he did or didn't say at the meeting. And, in fact, they did that at the first trial, and he gave answers to the best of his recollection.

So, Your Honor, as I say, we understand Your Honor has already ruled that the document itself, that the first layer of hearsay, Mr. Stegman authoring this memo out of court, is subject to the public records exception, but that does not relieve the plaintiffs of their obligation under Rule 805 to establish some exception for the embedded hearsay, the second layer of hearsay in this memo from Secretary Geithner, and the plaintiffs have not established the applicability of any such exception for the embedded hearsay.

THE COURT: Now, since I squarely ruled on this at the first trial, is it your position that $I$ have to -- you have to meet the standard for a motion to reconsider for me to now consider this?

MR. JONES: So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: And what is the standard then?

MR. JONES: So we think that we meet the standard for reconsideration.

I would also say that there are changed facts and circumstances, because the plaintiffs have now abandoned the only argument that they made for admissibility of the embedded hearsay at the first trial.

But it is also true, Your Honor, that although you admitted this document, Your Honor never --

THE COURT: Over objection.

MR. JONES: Over objection, correct.

There was never a clear statement about why the embedded hearsay was admitted. So it's not totally clear from the record that that issue was squarely resolved, although it was indirectly decided against us because you admitted the document.

THE COURT: I don't remember exactly what $I$ said on the record. I know why I admitted it, but I don't know what the record reflects.

What is the test then for my reconsidering it?

MR. JONES: So the test for reconsideration would be essentially a law of the case standard. Changed facts or circumstances would warrant revisiting a decision, as would a clear error of law.

THE COURT: That I made a clear error?

MR. JONES: Respectfully, Your Honor, we think that this is a situation where the law is clear that the embedded hearsay in this document must satisfy some hearsay exception to be admissible because the public records exception --

THE COURT: The D.C. Circuit has never said that. MR. JONES: The D.C. Circuit decisions support the proposition that embedded --

THE COURT: No, they --

MR. JONES: -- hearsay in a public --

THE COURT: They didn't say that. They ducked it.

MR. JONES: The question of whether?

THE COURT: Whether the embedded has to have an exception.

MR. JONES: So --

THE COURT: Has to meet an exception.

I don't think they said it.

Tell me the case where they said it.

MR. JONES: So there are certainly decisions from other courts in this district.

THE COURT: Oh, that doesn't mean a thing.

MR. JONES: Fair enough.
There are decisions of other -- of multiple other circuits: The Eleventh Circuit, the First Circuit.

THE COURT: Well, that's like the Seventh. That
doesn't mean anything either.

MR. JONES: The First Circuit said that "Decisions
in this and other Circuits squarely hold that hearsay
statements by third persons are not admissible under this exception merely because they appear within public records," meaning the public-records exception.

I don't believe that the -- oh, I'm sorry. The D.C. Circuit case that we think is the closest statement of the law here is called Hackley v. Roudebush.

THE COURT: What's the name?
MR. JONES: It's from 1975.

It's 520 F.2d 108.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JONES: And the D.C. Circuit said, "There will often be a double- or triple-hearsay problem. See Rule 805."

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JONES: Even though the document at issue itself may be admissible under Rule $803(6)$ or (8) (b), and 803(8)(b) is the public records exception.

So the D.C. Circuit comes pretty close.

There's another case we cited from the
D.C. Circuit, Czekalski v. Peters. It's 475 F.3d 360, Footnote 2.

This was in response to an argument that an OIG
report, which is a public record, an argument that that report contained embedded hearsay statements.

The D.C. Circuit held that those embedded hearsay statements in the public record would be admissible as admissions by a party opponent.

So the D.C. Circuit was looking for and found another exception that covered embedded hearsay in a public record.

THE COURT: So they didn't have to resolve the issue.

MR. JONES: They didn't address the issue, although it would have been unnecessary to even mention the party admission exception.

THE COURT: Well, the reverse of that is they didn't need to decide the issue.

MR. JONES: Fair enough.
I would just conclude by saying that the plaintiffs don't say --

THE COURT: I might give them a chance.
MR. JONES: The plaintiffs haven't identified a single case from any court anywhere that supports the notion that it's a multilayer exception. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's a nice point.
Defense want to bother -- I mean, plaintiffs want to bother?

MR. ZAGAR: I hate to take the time, Your Honor, but they've kind of given me no choice.

Let's start with standard. Your Honor put your finger on it. They made this argument pretrial. Your Honor disagreed, overruled it. They made the argument during trial. Your Honor disagreed, overruled it. It's the same thing for the third time.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZAGAR: I acknowledge our side has done some of the same.

We don't expect Your Honor to change your mind. I don't think defendants really expect Your Honor to change your mind, and you shouldn't and here's why.

THE COURT: I'll look at it.

MR. ZAGAR: The very first thing that Mr. Jones said is there's no dispute that there's two layers of hearsay and that we need to make exceptions. I hate to burst his bubble: There's very much in dispute about that.

They talk about the embedded hearsay and the second layer of hearsay. There is no embedded hearsay. Our argument all along has been, there is no embedded hearsay, the whole thing is a public record, and that's why it's admissible, and let me explain why.

Your Honor held that the document, this document on the screen, was admissible as a public record. And they
call it the Stegman memo, I understand why, because it says: From Michael Stegman.

But remember, this is the public-records exception. So this is not a public record of Mr. Stegman, it's not a public record of Treasury Secretary Geithner, it's a public record of the Treasury Department.

A memo like this created by the Treasury Department for the Treasury Department based on information provided by the Treasury Department to the Treasury Department does not contain any hearsay, it's all the Treasury Department. That's the whole point of the public-records exception.

Defendants' argument, and this will sound familiar, is essentially that this memo, that Your Honor has held constitutes public record, contains hearsay. There's this embedded hearsay, because Secretary Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, conveyed to Mr. Stegman, a senior Treasury official, the information, and Mr. Stegman typed up the memo instead of the Treasury Secretary Geithner typing up the memo himself. That's essentially their argument. And as my friend, Mr. Hoffman, will agree me, the application of the rule does not turn on who did the typing.

The whole point of the rule -- and remember, the rule has two parts. It has to be a record of the agency's activity, and subpart $B$ of the rule, it has to be
trustworthy. Defendants have to fail to show that the source of the information was untrustworthy. It has to meet both parts. Your Honor held twice that it did meet both parts.

The whole point of the rule against hearsay is to exclude statements that are not trustworthy. That's why the rule against hearsay exists. The whole point of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay, including this one, the public records exception, is to admit statements that look like they're hearsay but they are trustworthy for some other reason.

As Your Honor held, this memo falls into that second category. It looks like it would be hearsay because it's an out-of-court statement offered for the truth, but there are other reasons why we know it's trustworthy enough to admit. That's the whole point of the public-records exception. That's how it works.

So what defendants essentially want to do -- and they admit -- they say in their brief, "We admit that Secretary Geithner's a trustworthy source of information"; they almost use those exacts words. But they want to say, but notwithstanding that the rule itself says it's -- the burden is on us, the defendants, to show that he's not trustworthy, it still is not admissible because of some other rule because it's embedded here. It doesn't make any
sense, Your Honor. They're splitting metaphysical hairs between the memo and the contents of the memo.

Well, it's hard to wrap your brain around it, that if Your Honor has held that it's a memo, that, like, what the words on the page say are admissible as a public record but they say, well, no, because it was -- it went from the Secretary to Mr. Stegman and Mr. Stegman wrote the memo.

It's like so what? That's the whole point of Subsection B, is if it's trustworthy because it came from a trustworthy source like the Treasury Secretary, who has a public duty to be honest in his communications and we assume that he fulfills that duty unless there's evidence otherwise, which there isn't, that's the whole point of Subsection B is, if it's trustworthy enough, we don't care that it was conveyed from Secretary Geithner to someone else.

And the cases they cite, including the D.C. Circuit case they cited, those deal with cases where the memo or the report or whatever the document is is quoting some other person. It's quoting a witness, it's quoting -- you know, a lot of cases are about police records, a police report where officer so-and-so interviewed witness so-and-so and witness so-and-so said X. Yeah, that's hearsay, but that's not what this is.

So the idea that we just pretend that the Treasury

Department doesn't communicate with each other and then write things down because that would be hearsay, that just doesn't make any sense, it would defeat the entire purpose of the rule.

Your Honor got it right the first time, Your Honor got it right the second time, you don't need to do it again. You'll get it right the third time, I'm highly confident.

Just one more small point.
As if it weren't trustworthy enough, which it clearly is, there's another document that we'd introduce that is very, very similar to this. It's a memo, again, from Mr. Stegman -- actually this one is in the form of an email -- talking about a pre-meeting. So this was -- the actual document, PX205, is about a meeting on June 24 th, 2012. Some of the folks from Treasury had a pre-meeting with Mr. DeMarco and Mr. Ugoletti a few days before that. And this is Exhibit AA to our motion; the label is PX584.

And it uses very, very similar language. It says -- it refers to Mr. DeMarco, Ed, said at the beginning about his lack of sense of urgency about needing to adjust the PSPAs.

So we now have another document from another meeting, and this one, also a public record, exactly the same thing. It's a record, in this case an email, between a couple of different Treasury people, saying, here's what
happened at the meeting and here I'm writing down what happened at the meeting. It uses almost the same language as PX205 about a lack of urgency that Mr. DeMarco expressed.

I don't think you need any more trustworthiness, but now you have two documents that basically say the same thing. How much more trustworthiness could a person want? It should be admissible, there's just no question about it.

Their argument would basically write the rule -write the public-records exception out of the rule, because essentially what they're arguing is, again, contrary to case law, well, if Mr. Stegman had been at the meeting and just wrote down his recollections, that would be okay because he'd have personal knowledge.

But the case law, and we cited it and they don't dispute it, five, six, seven cases saying the person who writes the memo does not need to have personal knowledge because of this presumption that public officials will do their jobs honestly. That's the whole reason the rule exists.

So the fact that sometime before this memo was written there was -- and this is the other point. It says that the Secretary conveyed the information -- or, excuse me, provided an overview or -- provided a summary, something to that effect. Was that oral? Was it written? Was it oral and written? We don't know. But the whole point is it
doesn't matter. It came from a reliable source, a trustworthy source, it was written down in a public record.

That's the end of the inquiry. Your Honor got it right, you don't need to go any further. We're good. Thank you, Your Honor

THE COURT: Accidents happen.
All right. What's the next thing the defendants want to do?

MS. VARMA: Your Honor, Asim Varma for the defendants.

I'm very cognizant of the fact that we're past 5:00-ish.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. VARMA: I have three motions that defendants have made that still need to be argued.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. VARMA: They are very significant motions, and I think --

THE COURT: Can we to them Tuesday if we do jury selection Monday?

MS. VARMA: I think they would be a helpful to have --

THE COURT: Before trial?

MS. VARMA: Yes, before trial, because I expect that they will be relevant to openings.

THE COURT: To opening statements?

MS. VARMA: Yes.

THE COURT: When do you all want to try to do that then?

MS. VARMA: Well, what would work for the Court?

THE COURT: Let's do this off the record.
(Discussion held of the record.)

THE COURT: Back on the record.

We'll recess and try and finish this off at 10:00
in the morning and complete it by noon.
I do have some January 6th sentencings I've got to get in tomorrow.

MS. VARMA: Understood, Your Honor.

MR. HUME: Your Honor, may I make just one quick note for the record so we can then pick it back up tomorrow, maybe two quick things?

THE COURT: And some of the things that don't have to be done before openings we'll try to get to Tuesday by noon then.

MR. HUME: That would be great, Your Honor.
This is Hamish Hume for the record.

We raised two things with defendants, $I$ think, yesterday, that have not been briefed, we don't think they'll need briefing.

One is, one of our experts, Professor Thakor,

Anjan Thakor, only addresses the periodic commitment fee issue. We view that as a defense, and, therefore, we think -- last time he appeared in the case-in-chief and then again in rebuttal. We think he can just appear in rebuttal. And their expert has talked about periodic Amendment fees, so he would appear to rebut that.

But we do want to be sure we're not taking a risk -- we think that's correct. We don't want them to object after they rest their case and not be able to present him.

So we've asked if they agree, I don't know if they're ready to say now, we can deal it with tomorrow, but I wanted to make sure it was noted for the record because I need to tell him for his own schedule that the plan is he's going to be only in rebuttal.

THE COURT: Okay. We can take that up tomorrow.
MR. HUME: Okay.
And then the second thing is, there's a very minor tweak to the verdict form where it asks if the Third Amendment violated the implied covenant. We think it should be the net worth sweep. We have raised that with defendants. We will give them a chance to respond to that tomorrow.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STERN: Your Honor, very briefly.

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Mr. Hume is, of course, correct, they did do us the courtesy of notifying us of about these issues.
But so long as we're on the record just so the Court knows, we may have an issue with reserving Dr. Thakor for rebuttal, and we may have an issue with the verdict form. But we'll caucus and try to resolve. If we can't, we'll let the Court know.
THE COURT: I'll see you in the morning at 10:00. COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
This Court stands in recess. (Proceedings concluded at 5:29 p.m.)
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## C ERTIFICATE

I, William P. Zaremba, $R M R$, $C R R$, certify that
the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-titled matter.

Date:__July 21, 2023


William P. Zaremba, RMR, CRR


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| 84/2 87/22 109/9 | 29/24 30/15 30/16 | 40/23 41/17 42/6 43/14 | wind [2] 10/24 116/6 | 134/3 135/8 135/12 |



