

# Long-Term Oil Supply Outlook: Constraints on Increasing Production Capacity

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# **A Detailed Assessment of Global Oil Capacity and Prices Through 2030**


**Dr. Sadad I. Al Hussein**

Oil and Money Conference

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# Oil prices continue to rise in spite of OPEC capacity announcements




**New projects are attempting to mitigate prices,  
e.g. Saudi Arabia**

<b><u>Oil Facilities</u></b>	<b><u>Capacity</u></b>	<b><u>O/S Date</u></b>	<b><u>Value (\$)</u></b>
<b>Qatif</b>	<b>500 k b/d</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>3 B</b>
<b>Abu Safa</b>	<b>150 k b/d</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>1 B</b>
<b>Haradh – 3</b>	<b>300 k b/d</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2 B</b>
<b>Hawiyah / Haradh Gas</b>	<b>125 k b/d NGL</b>	<b>2007/8</b>	<b>4 B</b>
<b>Khursaniya (AFK)</b>	<b>500 k b/d</b>	<b>2007/8</b>	<b>5 B</b>
	<b>80 k b/d NGL</b>	<b>2007/8</b>	
<b>Shaybah</b>	<b>250 k b/d</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2 B</b>
<b>Nuaim</b>	<b>100 k b/d</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>1 B</b>
<b>Khurais</b>	<b>1,200 k b/d</b>	<b>2009/10</b>	<b>8 B</b>
<b>Manifa</b>	<b>900 k b/d</b>	<b>2011/12</b>	<b>9 B</b>
<b><u>Other Support Projects</u></b>			<b>19 B</b>
<b>Total Projects</b>	<b>4,105 k b/d</b>		<b>54 B</b>

**And the Arabian Gulf countries are proposing 15 refinery projects  
6 of which are in Saudi Arabia**


	<b>Location</b>	<b>Capacity, b/d</b>	<b>Start-up</b>
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<b>East &amp; West Coast topping refs.</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>2012</b>
	<b>Jubail - Total</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>2012</b>
	<b>Yanbu - Conoco</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>2013</b>
	<b>Ras Tanura/Dow Chemicals</b>	<b>175,000 +</b>	<b>2012</b>
	<b>Jizan</b>	<b>200,000 - 400,000</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>Al-Zawr</b>	<b>615,000</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>UAE</b>	<b>Fujairah - Conoco</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>2012/2013</b>
	<b>Ruwais</b>	<b>300,000</b>	<b>?</b>
<b>Oman</b>	<b>Duqum</b>	<b>300,000</b>	<b>2012/2013</b>
<b>Qatar</b>	<b>Shaheen</b>	<b>250,000</b>	<b>2011</b>
	<b>Ras Laffan Condensate</b>	<b>140,000</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b>Iran</b>	<b>Arak</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>2009</b>
	<b>Qeshm</b>	<b>160,000</b>	<b>2012</b>
	<b>Condensate Splitters</b>	<b>360,000</b>	<b>2010-2011</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,400,000</b>	

However actual production has not increased and even 1 million bd would have a minimal impact. . .



Platts average monthly marketwire,  
EIA monthly global oil production

# And no "idle" OPEC capacity remains to be tapped



**> 400 billion barrels of reserves replacements and growth have materialized in 10 years !**

	<b>1986</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>North America</b>	<b>101.6</b>	<b>89.3</b>	<b>59.9</b>
<b>S. &amp; Cent. America</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>90.8</b>	<b>103.5</b>
<b>Europe &amp; Eurasia</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>84.6</b>	<b>144.4</b>
<b>Middle East</b>	<b>536.7</b>	<b>672.2</b>	<b>742.7</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>74.9</b>	<b>117.2</b>
<b>Asia Pacific</b>	<b>39.7</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>40.5</b>
<b>TOTAL WORLD</b>	<b>877.4</b>	<b>1049.0</b>	<b>1208.2</b>

## These developments raise key issues

Why are oil, condensates and NGL **capacities not responding** to increased oil prices?

Are there actual political, economic or **physical impediments** to increasing oil capacities?

Given the “abundance” of reserves, what is the **long term outlook** for oil supplies and prices?

# “Reserves” are inflated with >300 B bbls of “resources”

1.1 Trillion		Depleted	Statistical reliability	Production Outlook	Technical basis
Actual Reserves : 0.9 Trillion	Proven > 90%	Proven oil In Place – high confidence Developed – clear recovery factor Undeveloped – good. recov. est.	Growth thru actual reservoir mgmt. & performance	Improved Oil recovery thru existing technology	
	Probable > 50%	Probable oil in place – confident Developed - prelim. recovery factor Undeveloped – est. fair recovery	Growth thru delineation, testing & development	Clear opportunity with existing technology	
Contingent Resources: 1.1 Trillion	Potential > 5%	Potential oil in place – low confiden. Drilled – v. low recovery factor Undrilled – recovery likely poor	Growth thru pricing, delineation or IOR/EOR technology	Indicative data & potential opportunity	
	Resource: Uneconomic volume & commerciality	Likely presence but undelineated OIP or GIP	Profitability or Technology currently inadequate	Available access but lacks good reservoir and fluids data	
Prospective & Speculative Resources: 2.0 Trillion	Oil, Gas, Shales, EHC & to be discovered resources	Technically present but physically inaccessible hydrocarbons	Future resolution thru exploration & relevant technology	General geological, seismic and/or physical indications	
	(speculative outlook)	Conceptually Possible Hydrocarbons, incl. EHCs			

# Some capacity is from very mature reservoirs

–

e.g. 75% of Iran's production

Depletion Status	2005 M b/d	2010 M b/d	2015 M b/d
00 – 29%	0.450	0.850	1.117
29 – 49%	0.470	0.818	0.838
50 – 69%	2.363	1.955	1.627
70 – 97%	0.555	0.326	0.217
<b>Est. Capacity</b>	<b>3.838</b>	<b>3.949</b>	<b>3.799</b>

<b>EIA outlook</b>	4.2	4.2	4.3
<b>Iran officials</b>	4.2	4.6 - 5.4	

# The giant fields of the Arabian Gulf average 41% depletion

Iraq - 6	Iran - 8	Kuwait - 5	UAE - 6	KSA - 12	Qatar - 1
8 - Kirkuk 12 - Rumaila 16 - Majnoon 21- Rumaila North 24 - Zubair 27 - West Qurna	14 - Gachsaran 15 - Ahwaz 17 - Marun 25 - Agha Jari 32 - Rag e Safid 34 - Bibi Hakimeh 36 - Azadegan 37 - Parsi	2 - Burgan 23 - Raudhatain 29 - Sabriya 33 - Minagish 35 - Um Gudair	7 - Zakum 18 - Murban – Bab Hasa 20 - Murban Bu Hasa 26 - Fateh 30 - Asab 31 - Um Shaif	1 - Ghawar 3 - Safaniya 4 - Zuluf 5 - Manifa 6 - Khurais 9 - Abqaiq 10 - Berri 11 - Shaybah 13 - Marjan 19 - Qatif 22 - Abu Safa 28 -	38 - Dukhan
<b>49.5 Billion</b>	<b>84.6 Billion</b>	<b>90.2 Billion</b>	<b>45.7 Billion</b>	<b>336 Billion</b>	<b>3.2 Billion</b>

**Est. original reserves ~ 605 B barrels**  
**Est. remaining reserves ~ 360 B barrels**


# Technology is good but does not diminish production complexities

## 3-D seismic survey

AMPLITUDE


DETECT

FREQUENCY




Oil Field Structural extent

5 kms



# Oil outlook needs detailed scrutiny:



# Africa


**Africa's capacity increases mainly in Angola and Nigeria but declines within a decade due to the diminishing size of discoveries**

**1000 b/d**

16,000.00  
14,000.00  
12,000.00  
10,000.00  
8,000.00  
6,000.00  
4,000.00  
2,000.00  
0.00

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028

- Tunisia
- Sudan
- South Africa
- Nigeria
- Mauritania
- Libya
- Gabon
- Equatorial Guinea
- Egypt
- Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
- Congo (Kinshasa)
- Congo (Brazzaville)
- Chad
- Cameroon
- Angola
- Algeria



10,000.00  
9,000.00  
8,000.00  
7,000.00  
6,000.00  
5,000.00  
4,000.00  
3,000.00  
2,000.00  
1,000.00  
0.00

## Europe / North Sea

**The North Sea has peaked and is in rapid decline**

**1000 b/d**


1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028



1000 b/d

### FSU / Caspian


**A revitalized industry may sustain high production assuming geopolitical cooperation**



- Uzbekistan
- Ukraine
- Turkmenistan
- Russia
- Kazakhstan
- Former U.S.S.R.
- Belarus
- Azerbaijan


# The Arabian Gulf has the resources but regional turmoil undermines growth.

1000 b/d




- Yemen
- United Arab Emirates
- Syria
- Saudi Arabia
- Qatar
- Oman
- Kuwait
- Iraq
- Iran
- Bahrain

# The total outlook: a 15 year production plateau . . .



# GDP growth and supply shortfalls will raise the floor of oil prices \$ 12 / year per million b/d shortfall



# Conclusions

- **Proven oil “reserves” are overstated by >300 billion barrels of speculative “resources”.**
- **Global oil and NGL capacity is on a 15 year plateau constrained by mature reservoirs and finite reserves.**
- **The momentum of growing oil demand and the gap with limited supplies will drive up the floor of oil prices \$ 12 / yr for each million barrels of shortfall.**